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ABSTRACT
This dissertation involves three essays, studying firms’ decision-making on
marketing mix variables. Specifically, the first essay (Chapter 2) studies
the effects of distribution channels on firms’ advertising content decision.
In many markets, consumers may not have full information of product fea-
tures and prices when they shop. While consumers can search to acquire
such information, manufacturers and retailers often advertise price, product,
or both types of information to help resolve consumers’ uncertainty. This
chapter studies manufacturers’ and retailers’ advertising content decisions in
either a centralized channel or a decentralized channel, in a market where ad-
vertising affects consumers’ search behaviors and purchase decisions. I show
that in a decentralized channel, advertising may include more information
than in a centralized channel. Specifically, when a retailer in a decentral-
ized channel makes its advertising decision before the manufacturer and the
retailer decide on prices, it prefers more price-product advertising than in
a centralized channel; otherwise, it prefers more price-only advertising and
more price-product advertising than in a centralized channel. I also show
that in a decentralized channel where the manufacturer decides on product
advertising and the retailer decides on price advertising, there will be more
price-only advertising than in a centralized channel. Finally, I examine the
consequent effects of advertising strategies in different distribution channels
on channel members’ profitability, consumer welfare and social welfare.
The second essay (Chapter 3) studies the effects of channel structure and
types of consumer heterogeneity on a manufacturer’s product quality de-
cision. I show that a manufacturer’s product quality decision depends on
both its channel structure and the type of consumer heterogeneity. When
consumers are heterogeneous either vertically on their willingness-to-pay for
product quality or horizontally on their transaction costs, a manufacturer
will provide the same or lower product quality in a decentralized channel
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than in a centralized channel. However, when consumers are heterogeneous
on both their willingness-to-pay for product quality and transaction costs, a
manufacturer may even offer higher product quality in a decentralized chan-
nel than in a centralized channel under certain conditions, and consumers,
as well as the distribution channel, can benefit from an increase of consumer
transaction cost.
The third essay (Chapter 4) studies how firms with high service quality
(i.e. the high-type) can use tipping policy to signal their service quality and
distinguish from firms with low service quality (i.e. the low-type) when con-
sumers are comprised of informed and uninformed consumers. I characterize
the conditions under which tipping policy together with complete informa-
tion price can be effective signal device. In addition, I show that when the
ratio of the informed consumers to uninformed consumers is low, if the high-
type’s optimal decision is to choose to have a tipping policy under complete
information, it will signal with a tipping policy together with a distorted
price. Furthermore, I show that even when the high-type’s optimal deci-
sion is non-tipping policy under complete information, it might strategically
adopt a tipping policy to signal its service quality.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Consumers’ reservation prices (willingness-to-pay) are directly related to the
product/service firms provide although consumers may be different from each
other in terms of how much they valuate the product/service. Hence, in
their marketing activities, firms influence consumers’ reservation prices tak-
ing into account consumers’ heterogeneity. For instance, in the first essay
(Chapter 2), firms affect consumers’ reservation prices with their decisions
on advertising strategy. In the second essay (Chapter 3), a manufacturer
sets its product quality to influence consumers’ willingness-to-pay. And in
the third essay (Chapter 4), firms’ service offering directly affects how much
a consumer is willing to pay for the service. Particularly, when incorporat-
ing richer consumer characteristics in the market, firms’ decision might be
different from what the literature has suggested. For instance, the second
essay (Chapter 3) “the effects of consumer heterogeneity on product quality
in distribution channels” investigates the issue of a manufacturer’s product
quality decision when consumers’ heterogeneity is either two-dimensional or
one-dimensional.
Moreover, consumers may not have full information of product/service in
the market, and firms can choose to resolve consumers’ uncertainty or not.
This dissertation involves two strategies which firms can adopt to resolve
consumers’ uncertainty. The first one is advertising as studied in the first
essay “advertising content with consumer search in distribution channels”.
Firms can choose different advertising strategies, i.e., product-only advertis-
ing, price-only advertising, or product-price advertising to partially or fully
resolve consumers’ uncertainty. The second strategy is signaling as in the
third essay “tipping policy and signaling service quality”. A firm with high
service quality can use a tipping policy to “authorize” consumers to decide
part of the final price. By doing so, the firm sends a signal to uninformed
consumers such that they can infer its service quality.
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Furthermore, a firm’s decision-making on marketing mix needs to consider
the existence of other firms, either its direct partner in the distribution chan-
nel, or its competitors. The interaction between firms may lead to surprising
difference as compared to the situations without such an interaction. In the
first two essays (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3) of this dissertation, I study how
a firm’s interaction with its direct distribution partner will influence its de-
cision on marketing mix variables. Specifically, the first essay “advertising
content with consumer search in distribution channels” examines how change
of distribution channel (with or without an independent distributor) will af-
fect firms’ advertising strategy. The second essay “the effects of consumer
heterogeneity on product quality in distribution channels” studies how the
interaction between channel members influences a manufacturers decision-
making on product quality. In the third essay (Chapter 4) “tipping policy
and signaling service quality”, I study how a firm with high service quality
can send signal to uninformed consumers in the market to distinguish itself
from those with low service quality.
In general, Figure 1.1 describes the connections among three essays.
Essay 1: advertising 
content with consumer 
search in distribution 
channels 
Essay 2: the effects of 
consumer heterogeneity 
on product quality 
decision in distribution 
channels 
Essay 3: tipping policy 
and signaling service 
quality 
Firms use different ways to affect 
consumers’ reservation prices 
Advertising 
content 
Product  
quality 
Tipping 
policy 
Consumers are uncertain 
on their reservation prices 
Strategic effects on partners 
in distribution channels 
Figure 1.1: Connections among three essays
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CHAPTER 2
ADVERTISING CONTENT WITH
CONSUMER SEARCH IN DISTRIBUTION
CHANNELS
2.1 Introduction
In many markets, although consumers know of the existence of a product,
they may not have full information of its features (Kuksov, 2004; Villas-Boas
2009; Guo 2009; Sun 2010) or even prices (Zhang 2009; Desai et al. 2010).
On the one hand, consumers can actively acquire information on their own.1
For instance, a consumer may physically travel to a store to find out the price
or product features by incurring a search cost (Kuksov 2004). As indicated
in this example, once a consumer searches, she has to incur a sunk cost of
searching despite the subsequent purchase decision.2 Hence, the uncertainty
of how well the product will match her taste preference as well as the price
may restrain her from searching. This search restraint, in turn, can prohibit
the consumer’s purchasing intention.
On the other hand, manufacturers and retailers often use advertising as a
tool to resolve consumers’ uncertainty by informing them about the product
features, prices, or both. For instance, Wal-Mart Pharmacy advertises many
manufacturers’ medicines such as Prevacid and Advil online with detailed
item descriptions, nutrition facts, applicable symptoms and even possible
side effects. Target and Gamestop often advertise product information of
video games supplied by manufacturers. In the music industry, major retail
outlets are typically the sole advertisers and they advertise music samples of
recent releases. U.S. Cellular offers details of its plans through television ad-
vertisements, including specific descriptions about minutes, messaging, and
1While information on product features can be acquired prior to consumers’ purchase
decision, this research mainly refers to the context of search products. In contrast, informa-
tion on non-search products can only be known after consumers’ consumption experience.
2This search cost can contain both direct dollar expenditures and indirect costs when
consumers spend time and effort searching (Klein 1998). When the expected benefit of
searching is lower than the search cost, consumers will not search (Stigler 1961).
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data.
In addition to using advertising to help resolve consumers’ uncertainty on
product match, many retailers also advertise their retail prices. Specifically,
retail chains such as Wal-Mart routinely advertise their prices on television
and radio. Also, retailers often distribute weekly flyers with retail prices for
their upstream manufacturers’ products (Desai et al. 2010) or advertise retail
prices on their websites (Zhang 2009).3 Furthermore, it is also common for
firms to convey both product and price information in their advertisements.
For example, Macy’s reveals specific information such as textile, style, color
about Ralph Lauren’s products as well as the prices.
Firms’ involvement in decisions on advertising/information revelation has
been studied in channel literature (e.g. Huang et al. 2002; He et al. 2009;
Guo 2009) which in general concludes that channel decentralization leads
to less advertising/information revelation. In a centralized channel where
a manufacturer owns the retailer, the advertising decisions are made inte-
gratedly. In a decentralized channel, an independent retailer often plays a
significant role in providing information to consumers via television, newspa-
per, direct mail and internet as indicated in the above examples (e.g. Kotler
2003). Specifically, in some markets, retailers may need to make strategic
plans for their investment in advertising, or upstream manufacturers may
require their downstream partners to commit to such an advertising plan
even before they reach their deals on wholesale prices. In other markets, the
retailer may make its advertising decision after its upstream manufacturer
offers the wholesale price. Additionally, the practice of advertising can also
be executed by different channel members, with each member in charge of
one type of advertising content. For instance, while only the retailers can ad-
vertise the final retail prices, manufacturers can also advertise their product
details.
In this chapter, I intend to investigate three important issues regarding
firms’ decision-making on advertising content, namely, whether to advertise
and what to advertise, in a market where consumers are able to search for
information about product features and price. The first issue is the effect
of different distribution channel structures on firms’ decisions on advertising
3Note that although in these advertisements, information such as product names is
unavoidable, I call them price advertising because the main focus is on price information
rather than product details.
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strategy. Would more or less information be advertised in a decentralized
channel than in a centralized channel? The second issue regards the effect of
the timing of the advertising decisions on channel members’ profitability. The
third issue relates to the effect of advertising strategies on consumer welfare
and social welfare. While advertising can partially or fully, depending on
the level of the advertising content, resolve consumers’ uncertainty, it also
influences the channel members’ pricing decisions. Would consumers, at an
aggregate level, always benefit more from one type of advertising than the
others? How would the change in consumers’ search costs affect consumer
welfare and social welfare? The answers to these questions can help shed
light on the advertising and pricing decisions for marketing managers.
To address these questions, I develop a game-theoretic model. First, the
model studies a firm’s decision on its advertising content in a centralized
channel as a benchmark case. Then, the model examines various cases in a
decentralized channel. In the decentralized channel, I first consider the case
where only the retailer can advertise, then I study the case where both the
manufacturer and the retailer can advertise.
2.1.1 Summary of main results
The main result of this chapter is that consumers’ uncertainty on product and
price can be an incentive for firms to advertise more or include more informa-
tion in their advertisements in a decentralized channel than in a centralized
channel. This finding complements the literature in marketing showing that
there will be less advertising in a decentralized channel than in a centralized
channel (Michael 1999; Huang et al. 2002; He et al. 2009; Guo 2009). The
intuition of this finding is as follows. As commonly known, consumers may
be charged a higher retail price in a decentralized channel than in a central-
ized channel because of the double-marginalization issue. With uncertainty
on product match and price, consumers are less willing to incur a search
cost to acquire such information and consequently are less likely to buy the
product in a decentralized channel. To mitigate this negative effect on con-
sumers’ purchasing intention, a retailer in a decentralized channel may be
more likely to use advertising as a tool to resolve consumers’ uncertainty on
product match and retail price.
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Furthermore, I show that a manufacturer may not always benefit from re-
questing a retailer to pre-commit on its advertising strategy before wholesale
transactions. This is because this pre-commitment will restrict the manu-
facturer’s strategic influence over the retailer’s decision-making via the man-
ufacturer’s decision on the wholesale price. Instead, if the retailer makes
the advertising decision after the wholesale price decision, both the retailer
and the manufacturer can be better off. In this case, the manufacturer ben-
efits from having a strategic influence over the retailer’s decision on both
advertising and retail price. In the meanwhile, the retailer benefits from
not having to purposely avoid certain advertising strategies to prevent being
taken advantage by the manufacturer.
Additionally, I show that consumer welfare can be higher in a decentral-
ized channel than in a centralized channel. This happens when price-product
advertising is practiced in the decentralized channel and price-only advertis-
ing is practiced in the centralized channel. Although consumers get charged
a higher retail price in the decentralized channel, their uncertainty on both
product match and price is resolved by price-product advertising. Hence only
consumers whose tastes match the product well enough will visit the store
and purchase the product. While in the centralized channel, even consumers
get charged a lower retail price, their uncertainty on product match still re-
mains. This uncertainty requires all consumers to visit the store to acquire
the product information, including consumers whose tastes do not match the
product well enough and eventually do not purchase the product. Therefore,
consumers at an aggregate level may benefit from channel decentralization.
2.1.2 Related literature
The research in this chapter is mainly related to two streams of literature.
One is about firms’ advertising of product (e.g. Grossman and Shapiro 1984;
Meurer and Stahl 1994; Anderson and Renault 2009), price (e.g. Zhang
2009; Desai 2010), or both (Anderson and Renault 2006, 2007). For in-
stance, Grossman and Shapiro (1984) consider a competitive market where
advertising plays the role of matching products to consumers, and where
all consumers observe prices. Meurer and Stahl (1994) discuss two com-
peting firms’ advertising with horizontally differentiated products assuming
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again that all consumers observe prices. Zhang (2009) studies two compet-
itive retailers’ decisions on multichannel and price advertising. Desai et al.
(2010) discuss the price advertising strategies of two competitive retailers
with different service levels. This literature mostly focuses on one type of
advertising, either product or price. Anderson and Renault (2006, 2007) are
the two exceptions, which examine a monopolist’s decision-making on ad-
vertising content. Two main aspects distinguish the research in this chapter
from this stream of literature. The first is that I examine firms’ advertising
decision-making in different distribution channel. And the second is that
I allow different types of advertising to be conducted by different channel
members, where advertising affects consumers’ search behavior and purchase
decision.
The other stream of related literature concerns advertising in different dis-
tribution structures. Traditional advertising literature involving distribution
channels focuses on cooperative advertising (e.g. Berger 1972; Bergen and
John 1997; Huang et al. 2002; He et al. 2009), persuasive advertising in
distribution channels (e.g. Shaffer and Zettelmeyer 2004), and information
revealing in distribution channels (e.g. Guo 2009). There are both empirical
and theoretical research in this area. For instance, using data in the restau-
rant and the hotel industry, Michael (1999) empirically tests the theory that
franchised chains (decentralized channel) advertise less than corporate chains
(centralized channel) because of spillover effects across the franchisees. The-
oretically, Huang et al. (2002) demonstrate that both national and local
advertising are higher in a partnership model than in the traditional leader-
follower relationship of a manufacturer and a retailer. He et al. (2009) extend
Huang et al. (2002) to a dynamic model and show that, as compared to the
vertically integrated channel, the advertising level is lower with a coopera-
tive advertising mode where the manufacturer announces a co-op advertising
policy. In this series of literature, firms have considered advertising as a
tool to inform consumers the existence of the product, and consumers know
the price as they are aware of the product. Another closely related article
is by Guo (2009), who studies a manufacturer’s decisions on the format of
product quality disclosure in both centralized and decentralized channels. He
shows that in a decentralized channel, no matter whether a manufacturer or
a retailer discloses product quality information, there will be less information
disclosure in the decentralized channel than in the centralized channel. While
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this stream of literature usually focuses on one type of advertising in distribu-
tion channels without considering consumers’ search behavior, I study firms’
decisions on different types of advertising in different distribution channels
where advertising affects consumers search behavior and purchase decision.
In this chapter, I show that there may be more advertising in a decentralized
channel than in a centralized channel.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I set up
the model, study firms’ decisions on advertising content in both a centralized
channel and a decentralized channel, and analyze the effect of the distribu-
tion channel structure on advertising strategy and the consequent effects on
channel members’ profitability, consumer welfare and social welfare. In Sec-
tion 2.3, I discuss how the relaxation of some of the main assumptions may
affect the findings. I conclude this chapter with Section 2.4.
2.2 The model
I. Consumers. The market consists of one unit mass of consumers with their
reservation prices v uniformly distributed along a Hotelling line between 0
and 1, which is common knowledge to both firms and consumers. A con-
sumer’s reservation price is directly determined by the extent of product
match. The more the product matches a consumer i’s taste preference, the
higher her reservation price (vi). Consumers face uncertainty about the prod-
uct match (v) and price (r) if the firms do not advertise the information. To
resolve the uncertainty, consumers incur a search cost c to acquire informa-
tion and discover their exact reservation prices. For instance, a consumer
must travel to a retailer to inspect the product and find the price. The con-
sumer incurs the search cost even when she decides not to buy the product
after inspecting it and obtaining the price information. This search cost is
also unavoidable for those consumers who choose to purchase the product
even when the product and price information are publicly advertised since
they need to travel to the store to purchase (Anderson and Renault 2006,
2007). A consumer’s decision to initiate the search process or not depends
on whether her expected benefit of searching exceeds the search cost c, which
is common to all consumers. Once a consumer completes her search process,
she buys the product if her reservation price (v) is not lower than the re-
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tail price (r), that is, v ≥ r. Each consumer purchases at most one unit of
the product. To avoid the trivial case where no consumer will purchase the
product, I assume c < 1.
II. Firms. I consider a distribution channel where an upstream manufac-
turer produces a product and sells through a downstream retailer to end
consumers. In a centralized channel, the manufacturer owns the retailer and
decides the retail price (r) and the advertising content, which will be defined
shortly. In a decentralized channel, the two firms are independent, where
the manufacturer decides the wholesale price (w) and the retailer decides the
retail price (r). I first study the cases where only the retailer advertises in
the decentralized channel. Then, I examine the case where the manufacturer
decides on product advertising and the retailer decides on price advertising.
The marginal cost for producing the product is normalized to zero and the
wholesale price is the only cost for the retailer in the decentralized channel.
In addition, the cost to advertise either product or price or both types of
information is normalized to zero, and a positive cost does not qualitatively
change the main results, which will be discussed further in Section 1.3.
III. Advertising content. In this chapter, I study two types of advertising
content. One is product advertising, which helps consumers to figure out the
extent of product match. In other words, if the retailer advertises the prod-
uct information, each consumer will be informed about her exact v. This
product information can be advertised either by a retailer or by a manufac-
turer in a decentralized channel. The other type is price advertising, which
is always conducted by the retailer. If the retailer advertises the retail price
(r), consumers will completely resolve their uncertainty on price; otherwise,
they will rationally form their expectations. Different combinations of these
two types of advertising content affect consumer behavior differently. First,
when there is no advertising, consumers are homogeneous on their search de-
cisions and they all decide to search when the expected benefit of searching
is not lower than the search cost. Once they finish their search processes,
consumers resolve their uncertainty on product match and retail price, and
consumers with a reservation price v higher than the retail price r will pur-
chase the product. Second, when there is only product advertising, because
of the hold-up problem, consumers will not visit the store although they are
certain on the exact v (Anderson and Renault 2006). Third, when there is
price-only advertising, consumers are still homogeneous on their uncertainty
9
on product match, and they all will decide to search when the expected
benefit of searching is not lower than the search cost. Again, only those con-
sumers with reservation prices higher than the retail price will purchase the
product. Fourth, when there is price-product advertising, consumers com-
pletely resolve their uncertainty on both product match and retail price, and
they are heterogeneous such that only those consumers with a non-negative
surplus will visit the store and purchase the product. In this research, ad-
vertising is credible and truthful (Jovanovic 1982). The tie-breaking rule is
if a firm is indifferent between advertising and not advertising, it will choose
not to advertise; and if a firm is indifferent between advertising only one
type (either product or price) and advertising both price and product, it will
choose to advertise only one type.
2.2.1 A centralized channel
I first consider a benchmark case of a centralized channel where the man-
ufacturer owns the retailer. The retailer decides the retail price and the
combination of advertising content.
I. No-advertising
When the retailer does not advertise either the price or the product informa-
tion, consumers rationally anticipate the retail price and decide to search if
the expected benefit of searching exceeds the search cost. While consumers’
preferences are unknown to the firm, it cannot infer consumers’ reservation
prices even when they show up in the store. Once consumers are in the store,
after they inspect the product and retail price (r), only those consumers with
their reservation prices higher than or equal to the retail price (v ≥ r) will
purchase the product. Then the expected number of consumers who will
purchase the product is Prob(v ≥ r) = 1 − r. The retailer maximizes its
expected profit E(pin) = r(1− r) and obtains rn∗ = 1
2
, where the superscript
n refers to no-advertising.
Prior to search, all consumers are homogeneous and each of them has the
expected benefit of searching E(max{v − rn∗, 0}) = ∫ 1
rn∗(v − rn∗)dv = 18 .
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Therefore, the condition under which all consumers will search is
c ≤ E(max{v − rn∗, 0}) = 1
8
(2.1)
When the retailer does not advertise either the product or the price, if
c ≤ 1
8
, consumers rationally form the expectation of the monopoly price
rn∗ = 1
2
and choose to search. The retailer’s expected profit is E(pin∗) = 1
4
.
If c > 1
8
, consumers will not initiate the search process and there will be no
market for the product. Hence, the retailer’s profit will be zero.
II. Price-only advertising
When the retailer advertises only its retail price, it optimally charges a price
rp, where the superscript p refers to price-only advertising, such that the
expected benefit of searching for all the consumers equals to their search cost.
That is
∫ 1
rp
(v − rp)dv = c, and we have rp∗ = 1−√2c. With this advertised
retail price rp, all consumers visit the store to find out the product match
information and only those consumers with realized reservation prices higher
than or equal to the retail price (v ≥ rp∗) will purchase the product. Hence,
the retailer’s expected profit is E(pip∗) = rp∗(1− rp∗) = √2c− 2c.
III. Price-product advertising
When the retailer advertises both its price and product information, a con-
sumer decides to visit the store only when her reservation price v, which now
is certain, is greater than or equal to the retail price rpp and the search cost
c, that is, v ≥ rpp + c. Those consumers with v < rpp + c will not visit the
store. Hence, given rpp, the number of consumers who will visit the store
and purchase the product is 1 − rpp − c. The retailer maximizes its profit
pipp = rpp(1 − rpp − c) and obtains rpp∗ = 1−c
2
. The retailer’s profit thus is
pipp∗ = (1−c)
2
4
.
When the retailer advertises only its product information, all consumers
will be certain on their reservation price (v). However, since the retail price is
not advertised, consumers need to infer the retail price they will get charged
once they visit the store to purchase the product. While consumers know that
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they need to incur a search cost c, in case they initiate the visit, the search
cost becomes a sunk cost. And once consumers show up in the store, they
will get charged a retail price higher than that they expect before they search.
With this inference, consumers will not visit the store, which eventually leads
to no demand for the product and zero profit for the firm.
Table 2.1: Decisions and profits in a centralized channel
c Ad. strategy retail price profit
c ≤ 1
8
no-ad 1/2 1/4
1
8
< c < 0.4075 price-only 1−√2c √2c− 2c
0.4075 < c < 1 price-product ad (1− c)/2 (1− c)2/4
By comparing the firm’s profit across different combinations of advertising
content, I summarize the optimal strategy and the firm’s profits in a central-
ized channel in Table 2.1. Since advertising serves as a tool for the firm to
resolve consumers’ uncertainty, the firm chooses to advertise more informa-
tion when it is more costly for consumers to acquire the information on their
own.
2.2.2 A decentralized channel
I now consider a decentralized channel where the manufacturer and the re-
tailer are independent. As observed in the market, many retailers such as
Wal-Mart and Macy’s are in charge of the advertising activities, so I first
study the cases where the retailer determines advertising strategy. Later, I
will examine the case where the manufacturer can decide on product adver-
tising and the retailer decides on price advertising.
I. Retailer determines advertising strategy
In a decentralized channel, when the downstream retailer is the only firm
in charge of the advertising strategy, I first consider the following timing of
the game sequence. In stage 1, the retailer decides whether to advertise and
what to advertise. In stage 2, the manufacturer sets the wholesale price (w).
In stage 3, the retailer sets the retail price (r). This sequence (R-M-R) as
12
-r r r
Retailer decides
advertising content
Stage 1
Manufacturer decides
wholesale price (w)
Stage 2
Retailer decides
retail price (r)
Stage 3
Figure 2.1: Timing of the game with R-M-R sequence
shown in Figure 2.1 may apply to two scenarios. First, the retailer needs
to invest in advertising capabilities or plan advertising expenditures which
are not flexible and difficult to change, while the manufacturer and retailer’s
prices are more flexible. Second, the manufacturer requests its downstream
partner to pre-commit on the advertising content.4 I will study alternative
sequences later.
Based on the retailer’s decision in stage 1, I have four sub-games, namely,
no-advertising, price-only advertising, product-only advertising, and price-
product advertising. For each sub-game, I first solve the retailer’s maxi-
mization problem, which is then followed by the manufacturer’s maximiza-
tion problem. For instance, when the retailer decides not to advertise at
all, then the channel members profit functions are pindcM = w
n
dc(1 − rndc)
and pindcR = (r
n
dc − wndc)(1 − rndc). Solving the retailer’s profit maximization
gives rn∗dc =
1+wndc
2
. Then the manufacturers maximizes its profit and obtains
wn∗dc =
1
2
. These two pricing decisions are subject to the condition that con-
sumers will visit the store: c ≤ E(max{v − rn∗dc , 0}) = 132 . Similarly, I solve
the other three sub-games. I save the detailed derivations in the Appendix
and summarize the optimal decisions and channel members’ profits in Table
2.2.
Table 2.2: Decisions and profits with R-M-R game sequence
c Ad. strategy w r M’s profit R’s profit
c ≤ 1
32
no-ad 1/2 3/4 1/8 1/16
1
32
< c < 1 price-product ad 1−c
2
3(1−c)
4
(1− c)2/8 (1− c)2/16
I compare the retailer’s advertising strategy to the benchmark case and
4This pre-commitement on advertising content refers to the mode of advertising, i.e.,
no-advertising, product advertising, price advertising, or product and price advertising,
which does not mean that the retailer has to pre-commit on the retail price for the price
advertising option.
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have the following finding:
Proposition 1. When 1
32
< c < 0.4075, a retailer does price-product ad-
vertising in a decentralized channel where the retailer makes the advertising
decision prior to its upstream manufacturer’s wholesale price decision, but it
conducts no-advertising or price-only advertising in a centralized channel.
Interestingly, Proposition 1 shows that more information may be revealed
in a decentralized channel than in a centralized channel when consumers
have uncertainty on product match and price, and the retailer can choose
the advertising content. This finding complements the extant literature on
advertising or information revelation in channels (e.g. Michael 1999; Huang
et al. 2002; He et al. 2009; Guo 2009), which either empirically or theoret-
ically demonstrates that channel decentralization leads to less advertising.
The intuition behind our finding is as follows. When consumers have un-
certainty on product match and price, and they need to incur search costs
to acquire such information, they are less willing to initiate the search pro-
cess in a decentralized channel than in a centralized channel. This happens
because of the higher retail price resulting from the double-marginalization
problem in a decentralized channel. Consequently, if the search cost is high,
consumers may not even initiate the search process to visit the store and
consequently do not purchase the product, which directly hurts the retailer.
Thus, to reduce the negative effect of double-marginalization and to attract
consumers, when the retailer has control over advertising content in a de-
centralized channel, it is more likely to advertise its product and price in-
formation to resolve consumers’ uncertainty than in a centralized channel.
This resolving of uncertainty can in turn facilitate consumers to purchase the
product.
The R-M-R game sequence captures the case where the retailer’s adver-
tising decision is less flexible as compared to pricing decisions or the retailer
has to pre-commit its advertising to its upstream manufacturer.
Next, I study the game with M-R sequence, where the manufacturer first
decides its wholesale price (w), then the retailer decides the retail price (r)
and advertising content.
I solve the game again by backward induction. Given any wholesale price
(wd), the retailer decides its retail price (rd) and the advertising content,
where the subscript d refers to a decentralized channel where the retailer is
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-q q
Manufacturer decides
wholesale price (w)
Stage 1
Retailer decides
retail price (r) and advertising content
Stage 2
Figure 2.2: Timing of the game with M-R sequence
in charge of the advertising decision with the M-R game sequence as shown
in Figure 2.2. It can choose either no-advertising, price-only advertising,
product-only advertising, or price-product advertising. We leave the deriva-
tion details to the Appendix and summarize the optimal decisions and chan-
nel members’ profits in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Decisions and profits with M-R game sequence
c Ad. strategy w r M’s profit R’s profit
c ≤ 0.0139 no-ad 1/2 3/4 1/8 1/16
0.0139 < c ≤ 0.3447 price-only w1 p1 pidM1 pidR1
0.3447 < c < 1 price-product 1−c
2
3(1−c)
4
(1− c)2/8 (1− c)2/16
w1 = 1 − 2
√
2c + 25/4c3/4 − c, p1 = 1 −
√
2c, pidM1 = (1 − 2
√
2c + 25/4c3/4 − c)√2c,
pidR1 = (
√
2c− 25/4c3/4 + c)√2c.
Now, I compare the retailer’s advertising strategies in a decentralized chan-
nel with the M-R game sequence to its advertising strategies in a centralized
channel, and summarize the main findings in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. When 0.0139 < c < 1
8
(0.3447 < c < 0.4075), the re-
tailer does price-only advertising (price-product advertising) in a decentral-
ized channel where it makes its advertising decision after its upstream manu-
facturer’s wholesale price decision, but it conducts no-advertising (price-only
advertising) in a centralized channel.
Proposition 2 confirms Proposition 1 and shows that the retailer may ad-
vertise more information in a decentralized channel than in a centralized
channel.5 Again, the retailer uses advertising as a tool to mitigate the nega-
tive effect of double marginalization in a decentralized channel on consumer
5This implies that the retailer’s pre-commitment on advertising content is not the
driving force behind the finding of more advertising in a decentralized channel than in a
centralized channel.
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search and purchase decisions. When players follow the sequence of M-R, as
a follower of the decision-making in the decentralized channel, the retailer
decides its advertising strategy based on the given wholesale price. As a
leader of decision-making in the decentralized channel, the manufacturer op-
timally sets the wholesale price considering the trade-off between its profit
margin and consumer demand. The manufacturer’s pricing decision induces
the retailer to practice the price-only advertising strategy when the consumer
search cost is c > 0.0139. Therefore, compared to a centralized channel where
the retailer does not advertise when c ≤ 1
8
, it is more likely to operate price-
only advertising in a decentralized channel when 0.0139 < c ≤ 1
8
.
When the retailer decides its advertising content after the wholesale price
decision, if the consumer search cost is high such that c > 0.3447, to attract
consumers to initiate the search process and lead to purchasing behavior,
the retailer has to inform consumers of both price and product information
before they begin their search. Otherwise, because of the high sunk cost,
consumers will not risk searching, knowing that if the product does not match
their tastes well enough, they will not purchase the product even after they
search. Still, due to the higher retail price in the decentralized channel
than in the centralized channel, the retailer starts to advertise both the
product and price information at a lower threshold value of c than in the
centralized channel. Therefore, even without the retailer’s pre-commitment
on advertising content, in a decentralized channel, the retailer is more likely
to practice price and product advertising than in a centralized channel.
To summarize, Propositions 1 and 2 demonstrate the possibility that chan-
nel decentralization may lead to more information revelation in the market
where consumers have uncertainty on product and price and where the re-
tailer decides on advertising strategy. So far, the retailer is in charge of the
decisions of both price and product advertising in the decentralized channel.
In the following section, I allow the manufacturer to decide whether to ad-
vertise the product information and leave the decision on price advertising
with the retailer.
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-q q
Manufacturer decides wholesale
price (w) and product advertising
Stage 1
Retailer decides retail price (r)
and price advertising
Stage 2
Figure 2.3: Timing of the game with separated advertising decisions
II. Both manufacturer and retailer decide advertising
strategy
The timing of the game sequence is that in Stage 1, the manufacturer decides
whether to advertise the product information and sets the wholesale price.
Then the retailer sets the retail price and decides whether to advertise it in
Stage 2. This game sequence as shown in Figure 2.3, corresponds to the sce-
narios where an upstream manufacturer runs national advertisements on the
product it produces and a downstream retailer conducts local advertisements
on the final retail price.
The manufacturer has two options, advertising the product information
and not advertising the product information. Then I solve the retailer’s
decisions on retail price and advertising given any wholesale price under
each of the manufacturer’s advertising options. I leave the derivation details
to the Appendix and report the final optimal advertising decisions in Table
2.4.
Table 2.4: Decisions and profits with separate decisions
c Ad. strategy w r pidsM pidsR
c ≤ 0.011 no-ad 1/2 3/4 1/8 1/16
0.011 < c ≤ 0.463 price-only 1−√2c 1−√2c √2c− 2c 0
0.463 < c < 1 price-product 1−c
2
3(1−c)
4
(1−c)2
8
(1−c)2
16
I compare the channel members’ advertising decisions to the benchmark
case and summarize the finding in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. When 0.011 < c < 1
8
, the retailer does price-only advertis-
ing in a decentralized channel where an upstream manufacturer decides on
product advertising and a downstream retailer decides on price advertising as
modeled, but it conducts no advertising in a centralized channel.
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Proposition 3 further confirms that channel decentralization may result in
more information revelation. In the current scenario, the manufacturer is a
leader in a series of decision-making and has control over product advertis-
ing. As a follower, the retailer’s advertising strategy depends on the man-
ufacturer’s decisions on its wholesale price as well as product advertising.
When the manufacturer chooses not to advertise the product information,
the retailer does not advertise if the wholesale price is low and advertises the
price information if the wholesale price is high. Anticipating the retailer’s re-
sponse, the manufacturer optimally charges a high wholesale price to induce
the retailer to advertise and set a retail price such that consumers’ expected
benefit of searching equals their search cost. In this case, the manufacturer
obtains the full amount of the channel’s profit.
To further extend the discussion, when the manufacturer decides on the
product advertising, I allow the retailer to decide on both product and price
advertising.6 The analysis falls into two sub-games: the manufacturer does
product advertising, and the manufacturer does no-advertising. While the
first sub-game has the solution of price-product advertising with the man-
ufacturer and the retailer’s profits (1−c)
2
8
and (1−c)
2
16
, the second sub-game
converges to the analysis of the game with M-R sequence. By compar-
ing the manufacturer’s profits across two sub-games, the manufacturer’s no-
advertising sub-game is dominant. So, the main findings are verified when
the manufacturer decides on the product advertising first, then the retailer
decides on both product and price advertising.
2.2.3 Effects of channel structures on channel
members’ profitability, consumer welfare and
social welfare
I compare the channel members’ profits in different decentralized channels
and report the most interesting finding below.
Proposition 4. (Channel members’ profits) In a decentralized channel, the
retailer’s pre-commitment on the advertising content benefits the retailer and
6Since there is no extra benefit to do repetitive advertising, when the manufacturer
decides to do product advertising, the retailer will not advertise the product information
again.
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hurts the manufacturer when 0.0139 < c ≤ 0.0886 and hurts both channel
members when 0.0886 < c < 0.3447.
Interestingly, Proposition 4 shows that the retailer’s pre-commitment on
advertising content may hurt the manufacturer, which implies that in prac-
tice, it is not always to the manufacturer’s benefit to require its down-
stream partner to pre-commit on advertising content. The retailer’s pre-
commitment on advertising content may not benefit the retailer either. When
0.0139 < c ≤ 1
32
, the retailer will not advertise at all if it makes its decision
on advertising strategy before the wholesale price decision, since consumers
in any case will automatically initiate the search process to find out the
product information with the expectation of the retail price rn∗dc in the de-
centralized channel. However, if the retailer decides the advertising content
after the wholesale price decision, it will not be able to replicate the strategy
of no-advertising as when it decides the advertising strategy earlier, since its
advertising strategy is conditioned on the manufacturer’s wholesale price de-
cision. Without the presence of the retailer’s commitment to its advertising
strategy prior to the wholesale price decision, the manufacturer increases its
wholesale price to take advantage of higher profit margins and induce the
retailer to advertise its retail price. Therefore, compared to the situation
of being taken advantage of when the retailer makes the later advertising
decision, the retailer’s commitment to its advertising strategy protects and
benefits itself. When 1
32
< c < 0.0886, if the retailer decides its advertising
content earlier, it will advertise both product and price information. How-
ever, when the retailer makes the later advertising decision, it will advertise
only the price. This ironically will not benefit the retailer, since the manu-
facturer charges a high wholesale price and obtains a high proportion of the
channel’s profit by taking advantage of its leadership in decision-making on
pricing. In general, because of the separation of the decisions of advertising
content and retail price, the retailer has more opportunities to benefit itself.
While the retailer’s earlier decision on its advertising content can some-
times benefit itself, interestingly, under certain conditions, it can hurt itself
while hurting the manufacturer. This happens when 0.0886 < c < 0.3447.
This is because when the retailer makes the earlier decision on its advertising
content, its caution against the manufacturer’s subsequent pricing decision
restricts its own decision on advertising content. When the retailer makes the
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later decision on its advertising strategy, it advertises only the retail price,
although the manufacturer sets a high wholesale price which lowers the re-
tailer’s margin. With the increase of consumer search cost, the channel mem-
bers also face an increasing expected demand, 1−rp∗d = 1−(1−
√
2c) =
√
2c,
which would not be possible for the case when the retailer advertises both
the product and price information. While this positive effect of increasing
expected demand outperforms the negative effect of a thin profit margin,
the retailer is better off when it makes the later decision on its advertising
strategy. Therefore, the retailer’s earlier decision on its advertising content
can ironically hurt itself.
Next, I examine how different advertising strategies in different decen-
tralized channels influence consumer welfare and social welfare. Below, I
summarize the most interesting effects on consumer welfare and social wel-
fare.
Proposition 5. (Consumer and social welfare) When 1
8
< c < 0.4075
(0.3447 < c < 0.4075), channel decentralization leads to higher consumer
welfare if the retailer makes the advertising decision before (after) the manu-
facturer’s wholesale price decision. When 0.0139 < c < 0.3447, the retailer’s
pre-commitment on advertising content improves consumer welfare; When
0.0139 < c ≤ 0.0394, the retailer’s earlier decision on advertising content
improves social welfare and when 0.0394 < c < 0.3447, the retailer’s earlier
decision on advertising content deteriorates social welfare.
The most interesting result in Proposition 5 is that consumer welfare can
be higher in a decentralized channel than in a centralized channel where the
retailer makes the advertising decisions. This happens when price-product
advertising is conducted in the decentralized channel and price-only advertis-
ing is conducted in the centralized channel. With price-product advertising in
the decentralized channel, consumers receive information on both the prod-
uct and price, which ensures that only consumers with non-negative utility
will visit the store and purchase the product. However, with price-only ad-
vertising in the centralized channel, consumers only receive information on
the price, which means that consumers still remain uncertain on the product
match. To acquire this information, all consumers need to visit the store and
some of them eventually will not purchase the product after incurring the
search cost as a sunk cost. Therefore, consumers at an aggregate level may
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benefit from channel decentralization.
Furthermore, this proposition presents that the retailer’s decision on ad-
vertising content in advance can benefit consumers under certain conditions.
The intuition is as follows. As discussed earlier, when the retailer pre-
commits on its advertising content, if c ≤ 1
32
, it will not advertise and all
consumers will be uncertain about both product match and price. They
form expectations of the retail price rn∗dc =
3
4
and visit the store because
their expected benefit of searching is higher than their search cost. How-
ever, when the retailer does not pre-commit on its advertising content, if
0.0139 < c ≤ 1
32
, it will advertise its retail price rp∗d = 1 −
√
2c, which is
higher than rn∗dc =
3
4
such that all consumers will search for the product
match information. The common point across these two cases is that all
consumers will search, resulting in the same total search cost at an aggre-
gate level. The different point, however, is that consumers will be charged a
higher retail price when the retailer makes the later decision on its advertising
strategy than the earlier decision, because the manufacturer charges a higher
wholesale price to induce the retailer to advertise. Hence, the retailer’s pre-
commitment benefits consumers when 0.0139 < c ≤ 1
32
. If c > 1
32
, when the
retailer makes the later decision on its advertising content, it will advertise
both the product and price. This price and product advertising completely
resolves consumers’ uncertainty before they search; as such, only consumers
with a non-negative surplus will visit the store and purchase the product.
However, when the retailer does not pre-commit on its advertising content,
if 1
32
< c ≤ 0.3447, the retailer will advertise only its price without resolv-
ing consumers’ uncertainty on product match. All consumers will visit the
store and only some consumers with their reservation prices higher than the
retail price will purchase the product. Therefore, the retailer’s commitment
to its advertising content can benefit consumers when 1
32
< c < 0.3447. To
summarize, the retailer’s commitment to its advertising content can improve
consumer welfare when 0.0139 < c < 0.3447.
Additionally, Proposition 5 shows that the retailer’s earlier decision on its
advertising strategy benefits social welfare only when 0.0139 < c ≤ 0.0394
since the benefits to consumer welfare and the retailer’s profit offset the man-
ufacturer’s loss. Hence, from the social welfare perspective, the decentralized
channel with the retailer’s later decision on its advertising strategy will lead
to under-advertising comparing to that with the retailer’s pre-commitment.
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When 0.0394 < c < 0.3447, the loss on the channel’s profit with the re-
tailer’s earlier decision on its advertising strategy cannot be offset by the
benefit to consumer welfare. Hence, social welfare is lower with the retailer’s
commitment to its advertising content. Therefore, from the social welfare
perspective, there will be over-advertising in the decentralized channel with
the retailer’s earlier decision on its advertising strategy, compared to the
retailer’s later decision on its advertising strategy.
2.3 Discussion
In the basic model, I assume that firms can advertise at no cost and firms’
advertising does not reduce consumers’ search cost. It would be interesting
to investigate the robustness of our findings with the presence of advertis-
ing cost, and more importantly, with the consideration of reduced consumer
search cost due to advertising. To this end, in this section I discuss two exten-
sions in which advertising cost is included, first without affecting consumer
search cost, then with the reduction of consumer search cost.
I. Cost of advertising. Suppose a firm needs to incur a fixed cost of f to
do advertising. I then check the firms’ advertising decision in a centralized
channel as well as a decentralized channel where the retailer makes the adver-
tising decision. In a centralized channel, the firm’s profit of no-advertising
is the same as in the benchmark case pin∗cf =
1
4
when c < 1
8
. The firm’s
profits of price-only advertising, product-only advertising and price-product
advertising are the profits in the benchmark case minus the advertising cost:
pip∗cf =
√
2c − 2c − f , pipr∗cf = −f , and pipp∗cf = (1−c)
2
4
− f . Hence, the optimal
advertising strategy is the same as in the main model if f is not too high.
Stated differently, if f <
√
2c− 2c when 1
8
< c < 0.4075 and f < (1−c)
2
4
when
0.4075 < c < 1.
Similarly, in a decentralized channel where the retailer makes the adver-
tising decision prior to its upstream manufacturer’s wholesale price decision,
if the advertising cost is such that f < (1−c)
2
16
when 1
32
< c < 1, the optimal
advertising strategy is the same as listed in Table 2. In a decentralized chan-
nel where the retailer makes the advertising decision later than its upstream
manufacturer’s wholesale price decision, if the advertising cost is such that
f < (
√
2c− 25/4c3/4 + c)√2c when 0.0139 < c < 0.3447 and f < (1−c)2
16
when
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0.3447 < c < 1, the optimal advertising strategy is the same as in the main
model.
II. Reduced search cost due to advertising. In the main model, I
assume that consumers search cost is unaffected by firms’ advertising strate-
gies. Now suppose when consumers receive information from firms’ adver-
tising, their search cost is reduced. More specifically, consumers search cost
will be reduced to c/2 when they receive either product information, price
information or both.7 In a centralized channel, the firm’s price decision and
profit are the same under the no-advertising option. When the firm does
price-only advertising, the retail price is set such that consumers’ expected
benefit equals to the cost which leads to r = 1−√c and the firm’s expected
profit E(pip∗f ) =
√
c − c − f . When the firm does product-only advertis-
ing, there is no demand for the product because of the hold-up problem.
When the firm does price-product advertising, the firm maximizes its profit
pipp∗f = r
pp(1−rpp− c
2
)−f and gets rpp∗f = 2−c4 and pipp∗f = (2−c)
2
16
−f . Hence the
retailer’s optimal advertising strategy is: when c ≤ 1
8
, no-advertising; when
1
8
< c ≤ 0.815, price-only advertising; and when 0.815 < c < 1, price-product
advertising.
In a decentralized channel where the retailer makes the advertising decision
before its upstream manufacturer makes the wholesale price decision, the
problem-solving follows the similar procedure as in the main model except
the consideration of advertising cost f and the reduced consumer search
cost c/2 when there is advertising. So, the optimal advertising strategy is:
when c < 1
32
, no-advertising; and when 1
32
< c < 1, price-product advertising.
Therefore, by comparing the optimal advertising strategy in the decentralized
channel to that in the centralized channel with a reduced search cost because
of advertising, when 1
32
< c ≤ 0.815, more information will be revealed in
the decentralized channel. This means that the range becomes even broader
as compared to the main model.
7Since firms incur a fixed cost of f of advertising, and we do not distinguish between
different fixed costs for different types of advertising, it is reasonable to assume that every
type of advertising will reduce the consumer search cost by the same amount. I can show
that if consumer search cost is lower than c2 when firms do price-product advertising, the
results will not change qualitatively.
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2.4 Conclusion
In many industries, consumers need to incur search costs to acquire informa-
tion prior to making their purchase decision, and firms can advertise price,
product or both types of information to facilitate consumers’ purchases by
resolving their uncertainty. The research in this chapter examines firms’
decision-making on advertising content in a centralized channel as well as a
decentralized channel and the consequent effects on channel members, con-
sumer welfare, and social welfare. There are several interesting results which
complement the extant literature, and have important managerial implica-
tions for marketing practices.
First, a retailer may be more likely to advertise or include more infor-
mation in its advertisement in a decentralized channel than in a centralized
channel, which is different from extant literature showing that channel de-
centralization usually leads to less advertising (e.g. Michael 1999; Huang et
al. 2002; He et al. 2009; Guo 2009). A retailer can use advertising as a tool
to reduce consumers’ uncertainty about product match and price, and miti-
gate the negative effect of double-marginalization along with a decentralized
channel.
Second, in a decentralized channel where the retailer makes the advertising
decision before its upstream manufacturer makes the wholesale price decision,
there may be less price-only advertising and more price-product advertising
than in a centralized channel. While in a decentralized channel where the
retailer makes the advertising decision after its upstream manufacturer makes
the wholesale price decision, there may be more price-only advertising and
more price-product advertising than in a centralized channel. This finding
implies that a retailer’s advertising strategy should be conditioned on the
interaction between itself and its upstream partner as well as consumer search
cost.
Third, when a retailer makes the advertising decision prior to the whole-
sale price decision, the commitment to the advertising content may even
hurt itself as well as the manufacturer. One important implication of this
finding is that a manufacturer’s manager should be cautious on requiring its
downstream partner to commit to the advertising content. Instead, the man-
ufacturer can achieve greater influence on the retailer’s advertising decision if
the retailer does not pre-commit to the advertising content. The implication
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for a retailer’s manager is that the decision on when to decide the advertising
strategy should depend on the value of consumer search cost, and the earlier
advertising decision may not always benefit the retailer.
Finally, channel decentralization may increase consumer welfare. In a de-
centralized channel, the retailer’s earlier decision on its advertising strategy
can benefit consumers as compared to the case of the retailer’s later decision
on its advertising strategy. From the social welfare perspective, the retailer
with the earlier advertising decision can practice over-advertising under cer-
tain conditions. In addition, if the retailer makes the advertising decision
after the wholesale price decision, an under-advertising could follow under
certain conditions. This finding implies that from a social planner’s per-
spective, whether a retailer’s commitment to its advertising content is better
depends on the nature of consumer search cost.
The relation between advertising strategy and different distribution chan-
nel structures is a very important issue. It has significant implications for
marketing managers and warrants continuous research. In this chapter, I as-
sume that if the retailer advertises the product information, then consumers
can completely resolve their uncertainty about product match. In future
research, it may be worthwhile to investigate the case where there exists
residual uncertainty after the firm’s advertisement. In addition, I focus on
firms’ advertising decisions in a bilateral-monopoly channel. Future research
can extend to study the effects of competition at either the manufacturer
level, the retailer level or both, on the decision of advertising content.
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CHAPTER 3
THE EFFECTS OF CONSUMER
HETEROGENEITY ON PRODUCT
QUALITY IN DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS
3.1 Introduction
The product quality decision is one of the most important decisions for mar-
keting managers. When a manufacturer makes quality decisions about its
products, these decisions need to be conditioned on the structure of the
distribution channel through which the products are delivered to customers
(Jeuland and Shugan 1983; Gupta and Loulou 1998; Villas-Boas 1998; Econo-
mides 1999; Choi 2003). For example, Jeuland and Shugan (1983) present
that a manufacturer will lower its product quality when it sells through a
retailer as opposed to when it sells directly to end consumers. Similarly,
Villas-Boas (1998) demonstrates that a firm should offer a product with lower
quality in a decentralized channel for low-end consumers than in a centralized
channel as in Mussa and Rosen (1978). While this stream of literature shows
that channel decentralization leads to lower product quality, others often cite
the fact that firms offer products with higher quality when they sell via retail-
ers than when they sell directly. For instance, Parker et al. (2003), Lombart
(2004), and Shergill and Chen (2008) quote that factory outlet stores oper-
ated by manufacturers often carry lower quality products than traditional
department stores operated by independent retailers. Specifically, Consumer
Reports (1998) states that firms like Levi Strauss produce different product
lines for their factory outlet stores whose products may use “... less expensive
or lighter weight fabrics and plastic rather than leather buttons”; and “...
reductions in material quality and construction were found in cotton oxford
cloth shirts, leather belts, tee-shirts and pantyhose”, which can lead to lower
product quality in the outlet shops than in the retail stores.1 In this chapter,
1More examples can be observed in marketing practice. For example, a survey of
nearly 1200 information technology managers and professionals by Computerworld and In-
terUnity Group Inc. in 2004 shows that HP, which primarily sells through retailers, earned
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I study a manufacturer’s optimal quality decisions when it sells its products
in a centralized channel and a decentralized channel, and examine whether a
manufacturer may actually provide higher product quality in a decentralized
channel than in a centralized channel.
While different distribution structures may affect firms’ product quality
decisions, different consumers may view product quality differently such that
consumers can be heterogeneous on their willingness-to-pay for product qual-
ity. Additionally, when consumers purchase products, one important consid-
eration to them is the transaction costs they have to incur in the purchasing
process. On one hand, these transaction costs are necessary as consumers
have to travel to a shop, wait in line for checking out, haggle over the price,
return unwanted products, etc. On the other hand, these consumer trans-
action costs might matter differently to different consumers; in other words,
consumers may be heterogeneous on their transaction costs. For instance,
consumers may drive different distances to a shop; a slow internet may cause
different transaction costs for consumers with different time valuations; and
a computer software may require different learning costs for consumers with
different software knowledge. Consumer transaction costs are heavily af-
fected by market-level factors including political, economic, and technological
factors. Economic factors like gas price hikes can increase consumers’ trans-
portation costs of shopping (Johnson 2006). Technological advances affecting
personal computer operating systems can reduce consumer transaction costs
(Tyagi 2004).2
In this chapter, I design a game-theoretic model to study the optimal
quality decisions for a manufacturer when it sells its product in either a
centralized or a decentralized channel. I first consider a market where con-
sumers are heterogeneous on one dimension, i.e., either vertically on their
willingness-to-pay for product quality or horizontally on their transaction
costs. I then allow consumers to be heterogeneous on two dimensions, i.e.,
higher quality ratings than Dell, which was famous for direct selling (Enterprise IT Ven-
dors: Cost, Expectation, and Satisfaction, InterUnity Group and Computerworld Survey,
May 2004. http://www.computerworld.com/newsletter/0,4902,93340,00.html?nlid=AM).
Additionally, Lawton (2007) points out that “... there is a movement afoot by PC makers
such as Hewlett-Packard Co., Dell Inc. and Toshiba Corp. to build exclusive PCs for
certain retailers... Choosing an exclusively designed PC can end up costing consumers
more money, but the products are generally of higher quality.”
2See Tyagi (2004) for an excellent review of consumer transaction costs affected by
technological advances.
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both their willingness-to-pay for product quality and their transaction costs
when making the purchase. I further investigate the effects of the manufac-
turer’s quality decisions on channel members’ profits, consumer welfare and
social welfare.
3.1.1 Summary of main results
I have obtained a few interesting results. First, when consumers are hetero-
geneous either vertically on their willingness-to-pay for product quality or
horizontally on their transaction costs, the manufacturer in a decentralized
channel offers the same or lower product quality than in a centralized chan-
nel. Consequently, channel decentralization can lead to the same or lower
channel profits, and the same or lower consumer and social welfare. How-
ever, I show that, surprisingly, a manufacturer may provide higher quality
in a decentralized channel than in a centralized channel when consumers are
heterogeneous on both their willingness-to-pay for product quality and trans-
action costs. Thus, channel decentralization may have a quality-enhancing
effect. Intuitively, channel decentralization leads to demand recession due
to the double-marginalization issue. In addition, the manufacturer gets hurt
from demand recession especially when consumers with a high willingness-to-
pay for quality and high transaction costs are left out of the market because
those consumers are willing to pay more for the products than those with
low willingness-to-pay for quality, ceteris paribus. Therefore, a manufacturer
may optimally increase the product quality to make its product more attrac-
tive to those consumers who highly value the product quality, but with high
transaction costs.
Secondly, I find that, interestingly, the increase of consumer transaction
cost can benefit a retailer and the channel as a whole. This happens in a
decentralized channel when consumers are heterogeneous on both willingness-
to-pay for product quality and transaction costs. The manufacturer in the
decentralized cannel has a strong incentive to keep consumers with high
willingness-to-pay for quality, especially those with large transaction costs
to stay in the market by providing higher quality without increasing the
wholesale price much, mitigating the double-marginalization problem in the
decentralized channel. These efforts by the manufacturer result in a higher
28
demand as well as a higher profit margin for the retailer. When the transac-
tion cost increases, the manufacturer’s efforts become stronger. Hence, the
retailer benefits from the increase of consumer transaction cost. The manu-
facturer is worse off when consumer transaction cost increases with a lower
profit margin because of the higher cost to produce higher quality product.
Interestingly, the distribution channel as a whole can benefit from the in-
crease of consumer transaction cost, as double-marginalization is mitigated
and the benefit to the retailer is more than the loss to the manufacturer.
Thirdly, I show that consumer welfare may even increase in consumer
transaction cost when consumers are heterogeneous on two dimensions and
the manufacturer sells in a decentralized channel. The quality-enhancing
effect and the mitigation of the double-marginalization in a decentralized
channel allows consumers at the aggregate level to offset the the increase of
their transaction costs. Social welfare, which combines the channel profit and
consumer welfare, may also increase along with consumer transaction cost.
In contrast, in a centralized channel, the double-marginalization problem is
absent, and the manufacturer does not have the same incentive as in a de-
centralized channel to increase its product quality. Consequently, consumer
and social welfare always decrease with the increase of consumer transaction
cost in the centralized channel.
3.1.2 Related literature
The research in this chapter is related to two streams of literature. The first
stream is the effects of channel structure and channel coordination on distri-
bution channel relationships (Zusman and Etgar 1981; McGurie and Staelin
1983; Moorthy 1987, 1988b; Jeuland and Shugan 1983, 1988; Villas-Boas
1998; Economides 1999; Desai et al. 2004; Raju and Zhang 2005; Xu 2009).
Among this stream of literature, the following articles are particularly related
to this paper. Jeuland and Shugan (1983) discuss that channel decentraliza-
tion makes the manufacturer lower product quality below the joint maximum
level. Similarly, Villas-Boas (1998) shows that channel decentralization leads
to lower product quality for low valuation consumers in product line de-
sign when consumers are only heterogeneous on their preference for quality.
Economides (1999) argues that independent vertically-related monopolists
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provide products of lower quality level than a sole integrated monopolist
when consumers have different willingness-to-pay for quality. Xu (2009) ex-
amines a manufacturer’s product and price decisions in both centralized and
decentralized channels. Xu concludes that the concavity of the marginal rev-
enue function determines whether the manufacturer chooses a lower, same
or higher product quality when selling through a retailer than when selling
directly to consumers. These papers do not consider the effects of differ-
ent types of consumer heterogeneity on firms’ optimal decisions on product
quality and the consequent effects on channel members’ profits, consumer
and social welfare, which is the focus of the research in this chapter.
The second related stream of literature is the research on product quality
in the context of different consumer heterogeneities, namely, vertical (e.g.
Villas-Boas 1998; Economides 1999) or horizontal consumer heterogeneity,
or both vertical and horizontal consumer heterogeneity (Neven and Thisse
1990; Desai 2001; Tyagi 2004; Ellison 2005; Hotz and Xiao 2006). Tyagi
(2004) studies the effect of two-dimensional consumer heterogeneity on a
monopolist’s decision-making. Desai (2001) studies a monopolist’s product
quality and price decisions in a market where consumers, with either high
or low quality valuations, are continuously heterogeneous on their taste pref-
erences, and shows that consumer taste preferences do not affect the firm’s
product quality decision. Neven and Thisse (1990) demonstrate the effect of
consumer heterogeneity on two horizontal firms’ quality and price competi-
tion. Ellison (2005) and Hotz and Xiao (2006) focus on duopoly competition
in a market where consumers are two-dimensionally heterogeneous. These
papers do not study the important effects of distribution channel structure on
firms’ optimal quality decisions. In this chapter, I study the effects of differ-
ent types of consumer heterogeneity on product quality in different channel
structures.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2, I study a
manufacturer’s product quality decision and its consequent effects on channel
members’ profits, consumer and social welfare in a market when consumers
are heterogeneous either vertically on their willingness-to-pay for product
quality or horizontally on their transaction costs. In section 3.3, I exam-
ine a manufacturer’s product quality decision in a market when consumers
are heterogeneous on both their willingness-to-pay for product quality and
transaction costs. I conclude this chapter with section 3.4.
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3.2 One-dimensional consumer
heterogeneity
3.2.1 Vertical heterogeneity
I first consider a market where consumers are vertically heterogeneous with
respect to their willingness-to-pay for product quality. The mass of con-
sumers in the market is normalized to one. Consumers are uniformly dis-
tributed over θ ∈ [a, 1] where 0 ≤ a < 1. Given product quality q and retail
price p, the utility of a consumer of type θ is given by u(θ, q, p) = θq − p.
Each consumer purchases one unit of product if her utility is non-negative.
The manufacturer’s unit production cost is a quadratic function of product
quality c = q2 (Moorthy 1988a; Desai 2001; Tyagi 2004).3
I. A centralized channel
When the manufacturer sells its products directly to end consumers, for any
given product quality qvc and price pvc, where v and c respectively refer to ver-
tically heterogeneous consumers and centralized channel, consumers who are
located at θ ∈ [max{a, pvc
qvc
}, 1] will purchase the product. The manufacturer’s
profit is given by pivc = (pvc − q2vc)Dvc where Dvc = min{ 11−a(1− pvcqvc ), 1}.
I maximize the manufacturer’s profit pivc with respect to its retail price pvc
and product quality qvc, and obtain the following optimal decisions q
∗
vc, p
∗
vc
and the consequent profit pi∗vc
q∗vc =
{
1
3
, if a ≤ 2
3
;
a
2
, if 2
3
< a < 1;
p∗vc =
{
2
9
, if a ≤ 2
3
;
a2
2
, if 2
3
< a < 1.
(3.1)
pi∗vc =
{
1
27(1−a) , if a ≤ 23 ;
a2
4
, if 2
3
< a < 1.
(3.2)
When consumers are more heterogeneous (a ≤ 2
3
), the market is not fully
covered since the consumers with low willingness-to-pay θ ∈ [a, 2
3
) are rel-
3The results will not change qualitatively if the production cost is more general as
c = s× q2, where s > 0 (Desai 2001). Here, s can be understood as the level of production
technology. The more advanced the production technology, the lower the production cost
and the smaller the value of s.
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atively not profitable to the manufacturer and the manufacturer’s optimal
product quality q∗vc is independent of a. However, when consumers are less
heterogeneous (a > 2
3
), the market is fully covered and the manufacturer’s
optimal product quality q∗vc increases with a.
Given the manufacturer’s optimal decisions q∗vc and p
∗
vc, each individual
consumer’s utility is given by u(θ, q∗vc, p
∗
vc) = θq
∗
vc−p∗vc. By summing up each
individual consumer’s utility, I get the total consumer surplus CS∗vc. And by
summing up the total consumer surplus and the channel profit, I obtain the
social welfare SW ∗vc.
CS∗vc =
{
1
54(1−a) , if a ≤ 23 ;
a(1−a)
4
, if 2
3
< a < 1;
SW ∗vc =
{
1
18(1−a) , if a ≤ 23 ;
a
4
, if 2
3
< a < 1.
(3.3)
II. A decentralized channel
When the manufacturer sells its products through an independent retailer
to end consumers, the manufacturer first sets the product quality qvd and
wholesale price wvd, then the retailer sets the retail price pvd. The channel
members’ profit functions are given by pivm = (wvd − q2vd)Dvd and pivr =
(pvd − wvd)Dvd where Dvd = min{ 11−a(1− pvdqvd ), 1}.
Following backward induction, I first maximize the retailer’s profit pivr
with respect to its retail price pvd to get its best response, then maximize the
manufacturer’s profit pivm with respect to its wholesale price wvd and product
quality qvd with the anticipation of the retailer’s best response. I have the
following optimal decisions q∗vd, w
∗
vd and p
∗
vd
q∗vd =
{
1
3
, if a ≤ 5
6
;
2a−1
2
, if 5
6
< a < 1;
w∗vd =
{
2
9
, if a ≤ 5
6
;
(2a−1)2
2
, if 5
6
< a < 1.
(3.4)
p∗vd =
{
5
18
, if a ≤ 5
6
;
a(2a−1)
2
, if 5
6
< a < 1.
(3.5)
The profits for the manufacturer and the retailer, pi∗vm and pi
∗
vr are
pi∗vm =
{
1
54(1−a) , if a ≤ 56 ;
(2a−1)2
4
, if 5
6
< a < 1;
pi∗vr =
{
1
108(1−a) , if a ≤ 56 ;
(2a−1)(1−a)
2
, if 5
6
< a < 1.
(3.6)
In the decentralized channel, the market is not fully covered when a ≤
32
5
6
and fully covered when a > 5
6
. Calculating in the same way as in the
centralized channel, in a decentralized channel, total consumer surplus CS∗vd
and social welfare SW ∗vd are given by
CS∗vd =
{
1
216(1−a) , if a ≤ 56 ;
(2a−1)(1−a)
4
, if 5
6
< a < 1;
(3.7)
SW ∗vd =
{
7
216(1−a) , if a ≤ 56 ;
(2a−1)(2−a)
4
, if 5
6
< a < 1.
(3.8)
3.2.2 Horizontal heterogeneity
I now consider a market where consumers are horizontally heterogeneous
on their transaction costs when they make the purchase. In this model,
consumers are uniformly located on a Hotelling line x ∈ [0, 1] (Hotelling
1929) and the store is located at x = 0, the left end of the Hotelling line.4
Given product quality q and retail price p, the utility of a consumer located
at x is given by u(q, p, t, x) = q − p− tx, where t > 0 is the unit transaction
cost.
I. A centralized channel
In a centralized channel, given product quality qhc and retail price phc, where
h and c respectively refer to horizontally heterogeneous consumers and cen-
tralized channel, consumers located at x ∈ [0,min{ qhc−phc
t
, 1}] will purchase
the product. The manufacturer’s profit is given by pihc = (phc − q2hc) × D,
where D = min{ qhc−phc
t
, 1}.
I maximize the manufacturer’s profit pihc with respect to its retail price phc
and product quality qhc and obtain the optimal decisions
q∗hc =
1
2
; p∗hc =
{
3
8
, if t > 1
8
;
1
2
− t, t ≤ 1
8
.
(3.9)
When the unit transaction cost is high (t > 1
8
), the market is not fully cov-
ered since those consumers located far from the store incur high transaction
4The store can locate anywhere on the Hotelling line. Different locations do not change
the main results qualitatively.
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costs and they are relatively not profitable to the manufacturer. When the
unit transaction cost is low (t ≤ 1
8
), the market is fully covered.
The manufacturer’s profit pi∗hc is
pi∗hc =
{
1
64t
, if t > 1
8
;
1
4
− t, t ≤ 1
8
.
(3.10)
Total consumer surplus CS∗hc and social welfare SW
∗
hc are given by
CS∗hc =
{
1
128t
, if t > 1
8
;
t
2
, t ≤ 1
8
;
SW ∗hc =
{
3
128t
, if t > 1
8
;
1
4
− t
2
, t ≤ 1
8
.
(3.11)
II. A decentralized channel
In a decentralized channel, the manufacturer first decides the product quality
qhd and its wholesale price whd, the retailer then sets its retail price phd. The
channel members’ profit functions are pihm = (whd − q2hd)Dhd and pihr =
(phd − whd)Dhd where Dhd = min{ qhd−phdt , 1}. I solve the game based on
backward induction and obtain the following optimal decisions.
q∗hd =
1
2
;w∗hd =
{
3
8
, if t > 1
16
;
1
2
− 2t, t ≤ 1
16
;
p∗hd =
{
7
16
, if t > 1
16
;
1
2
− t, t ≤ 1
16
.
(3.12)
Similar to the case of a centralized channel, when the manufacturer sells its
products through an independent retailer, it optimally covers all the market
when the unit transaction cost is low (t ≤ 1
16
). When the unit transaction
cost is high (t > 1
16
), the market is not fully covered.
The channel members’ profits are
pi∗hm =
{
1
128t
, if t > 1
16
;
1
4
− 2t, t ≤ 1
16
;
pi∗hr =
{
1
256t
, if t > 1
16
;
t, t ≤ 1
16
.
(3.13)
Total consumer surplus CS∗hd and social welfare SW
∗
hd are given by
CS∗hd =
{
1
512t
, if t > 1
16
;
t
2
, t ≤ 1
16
;
SW ∗hd =
{
7
512t
, if t > 1
16
;
1
4
− t
2
, t ≤ 1
16
.
(3.14)
I summarize the effects of the channel structure and the type of consumer
34
heterogeneity on the manufacturer’s product quality decision and the conse-
quent effects on firms’ profits, consumer and social welfare in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. When consumers are vertically heterogeneous with respect
to their willingness-to-pay for product quality, the manufacturer’s optimal
product quality decision is independent of channel structure if a ≤ 2
3
and
the manufacturer offers a lower product quality in a decentralized channel
than in a centralized channel if a > 2
3
. When consumers are horizontally
heterogeneous on their transaction costs, the manufacturer’s optimal product
quality decision does not depend on the channel structure. The effects of
consumer heterogeneity on the retailer and consumer welfare are:
i. (Retailer’s profit) dpi
∗
vr
da
< 0 when a > 5
6
;
dpi∗hr
dt
> 0 when t < 1
16
.
ii. (Consumer welfare) dCS
∗
vc
da
< 0 when a > 2
3
,
dCS∗vd
da
< 0 when a > 5
6
;
dCS∗hc
dt
> 0 when t < 1
8
,
dCS∗hd
dt
> 0 when t < 1
16
.
Proposition 1 shows that different types of consumer heterogeneity affect
the channel decentralization effects in different ways. When consumers are
vertically heterogeneous, in the decentralized channel, the manufacturer may
offer the same or lower product quality than that in the centralized chan-
nel. Although this result is not surprising as it is consistent with literature
(e.g. Villas-Boas 1998; Desai 2001), it offers a benchmark case for subsequent
analysis when consumers are heterogeneous on both their willingness-to-pay
for product quality and transaction costs. When consumers are more hetero-
geneous (a ≤ 2
3
), the manufacturer’s optimal decision results in a non-fully
covered market in both the centralized and decentralized channel. Channel
decentralization does not change the manufacturer’s product quality decision
because the demand functions in both channels have the same price elastic-
ity. When consumers become less heterogeneous (a > 2
3
), the manufacturer
is either more likely to cover the full market in a centralized channel than in a
decentralized channel or the manufacturer has to lower its wholesale price to
keep the same full market coverage. In either case, the manufacturer’s bene-
fit of providing high product quality will be lower in a decentralized channel
than in a centralized channel. Consequently, the manufacturer will provide a
lower product quality in a decentralized channel than in a centralized chan-
nel. Different from the model where consumers are vertically heterogeneous,
when consumers are horizontally heterogeneous on their transaction costs,
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the manufacturer provides the same product quality in both distribution
channels. This is because all consumers have the same willingness-to-pay for
product quality.
In addition, I find that in the decentralized channel, when consumers are
less heterogeneous (a > 5
6
for the market with vertical heterogeneity and
t < 1
16
for the market with horizontal heterogeneity), the retailer’s profit
increases with the increase of consumer heterogeneity, dpi
∗
vr
da
< 0 and
dpi∗hr
dt
>
0. In those cases, the retailer enjoys the leverage of more heterogeneous
consumers for lower wholesale prices. We also find that when consumers are
less heterogeneous, consumer welfare may even increase with the magnitude
of consumer heterogeneity, dCS
∗
vc
da
< 0,
dCS∗vd
da
< 0; and
dCS∗hc
dt
> 0,
dCS∗hd
dt
> 0.
This happens when the market is fully covered, and the manufacturer has
the incentive to lower prices with the increase of consumer heterogeneity to
keep all consumers to stay in the market.
3.3 Two-dimensional consumer
heterogeneity
In this section, I consider a market where consumers are heterogeneous both
vertically on their willingness-to-pay for product quality and horizontally on
their transaction costs, and their heterogeneity is captured by a rectangle
model as well established in literature (e.g., Neven and Thisse 1990; Tyagi
2004).5 In this rectangle model, the vertical dimension captures consumers’
vertical locations (θ ∈ [a, 1]) and heterogeneity on their willingness-to-pay
for product quality.6 The horizontal dimension denotes consumers’ hori-
zontal locations (x ∈ [0, 1]) and captures consumers’ heterogeneity on their
transaction costs when they make a purchase. A unit mass of consumers
are uniformly distributed over the rectangle [a, 1]× [0, 1], and the retailer is
located on the left end of the horizontal dimension; that is x = 0.
Following the related literature in the context of two-dimensional consumer
5With this model, I implicitly assume that consumers’ vertical heterogeneity and hor-
izontal heterogeneity are independent. If these two dimensions are positively correlated,
the findings in current model setup might still hold. If these two dimensions are negatively
correlated, the findings in current model setup may not hold.
6In this chapter, I focus on the case of a < 35 which generates the most interesting
result.
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We acknowledge some limitations of this paper. In this paper, consumers are uniformly dis-
tributed on both quality valuation and transaction cost dimensions. In the future, it will be worth-
while to examine the cases with different consumer distributions on either one of these two dimensions
or both dimensions. In addition, in this paper, there is only one manufacturer and one retailer. Fu-
ture research can study competition at either the upstream level, the downstream level, or both
levels, when consumers differ both horizontally and vertically. We are currently working on some of
these topics, and hope this research can inspire more interest in this area.
a
21
0 1 
1 
Figure 3.1: A rectangle model
heterogeneity (Desai 2001; Tyagi 2004; Ellison 2005; Hotz and Xiao 2006),
I define consumers’ utility function as follows. Given product quality q and
retail price p, for a consumer located at (θ, x) as shown in Figure 3.1, her
surplus from buying the product is given by
u(θ, x, q, t, p) = θq − tx− p. (3.15)
As shown in Figure 3.1, consumers located on line θ(x) are marginal con-
sumers who are indifferent between purchasing the product and not purchas-
ing. All consumers above this line, as depicted by the shaded area in Figure
3.1, will purchase the product.
3.3.1 A Centralized Channel
I again start with the case when the manufacturer sells in a centralized
channel. Depending on the product quality q and the retail price p, the
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manufacturer’s demand is characterized as7
D =
{
1
1−a(1− pq − t2q ), if q − p ≥ t;
(q−p)2
2qt(1−a) , if q − p < t.
(3.16)
It is noteworthy that the above two demand functions reflect two different
shapes of market coverage. When q − p > t, the right end of the marginal
consumer line θ(x) is below (θ, x) = (1, 1), and the shape of market coverage
is a trapezoid. When q − p ≤ t, the right end of the marginal consumer line
θ(x) is left to (θ, x) = (1, 1), and the shape of market coverage is a triangle.
The manufacturer’s profit is given by
pi = (p− q2)×D =
{
(p− q2)[ 1
1−a(1− pq − t2q )], if q − p ≥ t;
(p− q2) (q−p)2
(1−a)2qt , if q − p < t.
(3.17)
Maximizing the manufacturer’s profit with respect to the product quality
and retail price, we have the optimal quality (q∗C) and retail price (p
∗
C) as
q∗C =
{
1+
√
1+6t
6
, if 0 < t ≤ 4
25
;
2
5
, if t > 4
25
;
p∗C =
{
2−3t+2√1+6t
18
, if 0 < t ≤ 4
25
;
6
25
, if t > 4
25
.
(3.18)
Consequently, the centralized channel’s profit pi∗C is given by
pi∗C =
{
(1−6t+√1+6t)2
54(1+
√
1+6t)(1−a) , if 0 < t ≤ 425 ;
8
3125t(1−a) , if t >
4
25
.
(3.19)
When the unit transaction cost is low (t ≤ 4
25
), the manufacturer’s optimal
product quality increases in t (Tyagi 2004) and the market coverage has
a trapezoid shape. While consumer transaction costs increase with t, the
manufacturer has more incentive to increase its product quality to offset the
negative effect of consumer transaction cost, especially on those consumers
with high θ and x. When the unit transaction cost is high (t > 4
25
), to
the manufacturer, covering the far-located consumers is no longer profitable
7When the consumer with the highest willingness-to-pay for product quality and the
largest transaction cost (θ, x) = (1, 1) always buys a product, u(θ, x, q, t, p) = q × 1 −
p − t × 1 ≥ 0, which means q − p ≥ t, and D = 11−a (1 − pq − t2q ). When the consumer
with the highest willingness-to-pay for product quality and the largest transaction cost
(θ, x) = (1, 1) does not buy a product, u(θ, x, q, t, p) = q × 1− p− t× 1 < 0, which means
q − p < t, and D = (q−p)22qt(1−a) .
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because of the large transaction costs, even for the consumers who value
product quality the most (θ = 1). Therefore, a further increase of the unit
transaction cost t will no longer incentivize the manufacturer to increase
product quality and the market coverage has a triangle shape.
3.3.2 A Decentralized Channel
In a decentralized channel, the manufacturer decides the wholesale price
(w) and product quality (q), then the retailer decides the retail price (p).
Depending on the product quality q and retail price p, the demand is the
same as in the centralized channel case
D =
{
1
1−a [1− pq − t2q ], if q − p ≥ t;
(q−p)2
2qt(1−a) , if q − p < t.
(3.20)
The channel members’ profits are
pi(M) = (w − q2)×D =
{
(w − q2) 1
1−a [1− pq − t2q ], if q − p ≥ t;
(w − q2) (q−p)2
2qt(1−a) , if q − p < t;
(3.21)
pi(R) = (p− w)×D =
{
(p− w) 1
1−a [1− pq − t2q ], if q − p ≥ t;
(p− w) (q−p)2
2qt(1−a) , if q − p < t.
(3.22)
I first obtain the retailer’s optimal retail price given the product quality
and wholesale price, then solve the optimal product quality and the wholesale
price for the manufacturer. The derivation details have been saved for the
Appendix, and I report the optimal product quality q∗D and prices w
∗
D, p
∗
D as
the following:
q∗D =

1+
√
1+6t
6
, if 0 < t ≤ 3
32
;√
3t
2
, if 3
32
< t < 8
75
;
2
5
, if t ≥ 8
75
;
w∗D =

2−3t+2√1+6t
18
, if 0 < t ≤ 3
32
;√
3t
2
− 3t
2
, if 3
32
< t < 8
75
;
6
25
, if t ≥ 8
75
;
(3.23)
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p∗D =

5−12t+5√1+6t
36
, if 0 < t ≤ 3
32
;√
3t
2
− t, if 3
32
< t < 8
75
;
22
75
, if t ≥ 8
75
.
(3.24)
The profits for the manufacturer pi(M)∗ and the retailer pi(R)∗ are
pi(M)∗ =

(1−6t+√1+6t)2
108(1+
√
1+6t)(1−a) , if 0 < t ≤ 332 ;
t
1−a(
1
2
−
√
3t
2
), if 3
32
< t < 8
75
;
32
28125t(1−a) , if t ≥ 875 ;
(3.25)
pi(R)∗ =

(1−6t+√1+6t)2
216(1+
√
1+6t)(1−a) , if 0 < t ≤ 332 ;
t
1−a
√
t
24
, if 3
32
< t < 8
75
;
64
84375t(1−a) , if t ≥ 875 .
(3.26)
When the unit transaction cost is low (t < 8
75
), the manufacturer’s product
quality increases in t. This is again due to the manufacturer’s incentive to
cover those consumers with a high willingness-to-pay for quality as in the
centralized channel. The market coverage has a trapezoid shape. However,
when the unit transaction cost is high (t ≥ 8
75
), it is no longer profitable
for the retailer to cover far-located consumers, even for those who value the
product quality the most (θ = 1). The market coverage has a triangle shape.
3.3.3 Effects of the channel structure and type
of consumer heterogeneity
Based on the results in the centralized and decentralized channels above, I
analyze the effects of channel structure on product quality, channel members’
profits, consumer and social welfare.
First, I compare the product quality levels in the centralized channel and
in the decentralized channel when consumers are two-dimensionally heteroge-
neous, and summarize the most interesting result in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. (Product quality) When consumers are two-dimensionally
heterogeneous, q∗D > q
∗
C when
3
32
< t < 4
25
.
Interestingly, Proposition 2 shows that, a manufacturer may produce higher
product quality in a decentralized channel than in a centralized channel,
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Figure 3.2: The effect of channel decentralization on product quality
which implicates a quality-enhancing effect by channel decentralization. This
happens when the unit transaction cost is intermediate ( 3
32
< t < 4
25
) as
shown in Figure 3.2. This finding complements the extant literature (Jeu-
land and Shugan 1983; Villas-Boas 1998; Economides 1999) that channel
decentralization always leads to the decrease of product quality such that
“without joint ownership, the manufacturer has the incentive to lower the
product quality below the joint maximum level ...” (Jeuland and Shugan
1983). The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. When the unit
transaction cost is intermediate ( 3
32
< t < 4
25
), the manufacturer in the cen-
tralized channel can optimally decide its quality and price such that not
only all consumers with the highest willingness-to-pay for quality (θ = 1)
always stay in the market, but also some consumers with the largest trans-
action cost (x = 1) purchase the product, as long as their willingness to pay
for quality is sufficiently high. In other words, the manufacturer’s market
coverage has a trapezoid shape. However, in a decentralized channel, the
double-marginalization problem leads to a higher retail price, and it is more
difficult to keep the same consumers as in the centralized channel in the
market. Thus, the manufacturer faces a triangle demand function in the de-
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centralized channel instead of a trapezoid demand function in the centralized
channel. That is to say, many consumers with a high willingness-to-pay for
quality and large transaction costs are left out of the market. Since those
consumers with a high willingness-to-pay for quality are very profitable to the
manufacturer, the manufacturer has the incentive to retain those consumers
in the decentralized channel. To do so, the manufacturer has two approaches.
The first is to decrease its wholesale price, and the second is to increase its
product quality. The first approach with lowering wholesale price will benefit
all consumers the same way, even for consumers who will buy the product
anyway, and reduce the surplus the manufacturer can extract from each con-
sumer it retains. In contrast, the second approach with increasing product
quality is more efficient to target the consumers with a high willingness-to-
pay for quality since they value quality increases more than do consumers
with a low willingness-to-pay for quality. Therefore, the manufacturer opti-
mally chooses to increase its product quality rather than lower its price to
keep those consumers with a high willingness-to-pay for quality to stay in the
market. Thus, Proposition 2 establishes a role for a manufacturer to increase
its product quality to mitigate the double-marginalization problem in a de-
centralized channel. The implication of Proposition 2 is that we should not
always expect lower product quality in a decentralized channel, and channel
decentralization may actually lead to higher product quality.
It is important to compare the quality-enhancing effect of channel decen-
tralization in this model to the results in the models where there is only
one-dimensional consumer heterogeneity and where product quality in a de-
centralized channel is the same or lower than that in a centralized channel.
In the two-dimensional model, consumer utility depends on both product
quality and transaction costs. Therefore, far-located consumers with higher
transaction costs who purchase the same product on average value quality
more than close-located consumers with lower transaction costs. Therefore,
channel decentralization hurts more far-located consumers than close-located
consumers who have high willingness-to-pay for quality. As a response, the
manufacturer has the incentive to increase its product quality to deal with
the negative effect of channel decentralization on far-located consumers. In
contrast, the one-dimensional models do not capture this effect of channel de-
centralization on hurting far-located consumers with high willingness-to-pay
for quality; thus, the manufacturer does not have the incentive to overcome
42
that effect with a higher product quality.
It is noteworthy that when 3
32
< t < 8
75
, the product quality difference
between the decentralized channel and the centralized channel increases in t.
The reason is as follows. While the unit transaction cost is not yet so high as
t > 8
75
, it is still profitable for the manufacturer to retain all the consumers
with the highest willingness-to-pay for quality (θ = 1), even the one with
the largest transaction cost ((θ, x) = (1, 1)). Consumers incur increasing
transaction costs in t, and this effect is stronger for far-located consumers
than close-located consumers. To attract those far-located consumers with
significantly high willingness-to-pay for quality, with the increase of t, the
manufacturer has to increase its product quality more. Stated differently, the
quality-enhancing effect of channel decentralization becomes stronger when t
increases. By offering this higher product quality, the manufacturer can effec-
tively mitigate the negative effects of double-marginalization since consumers
who highly value product quality will be back in the market even when their
transaction costs are high (x is close to 1). When the unit transaction cost
is relatively high ( 8
75
< t < 4
25
), the further increase of unit transaction cost
increases consumer transaction costs more excessively, especially to the far-
located consumers. It is no longer profitable for the manufacturer to attract
the consumers with large transaction costs, even when they have the highest
willingness-to-pay for quality (θ = 1). The quality difference between the
decentralized channel and the centralized channel gets smaller and the man-
ufacturer gradually gives up those far-located consumers with the increase of
t.
In this research, the quality-enhancing effect of channel decentralization
happens only when the unit transaction cost is intermediate ( 3
32
< t < 4
25
).
When the unit transaction cost is low (t ≤ 3
32
), both the decentralized channel
and the centralized channel face a trapezoid demand function. If the man-
ufacturer increases its product quality, the retailer will mark up more than
when the demand is a triangle shape. Therefore, the manufacturer lacks the
incentive to increase product quality to mitigate the double-marginalization
effect. Similarly, when the unit transaction cost is high (t ≥ 4
25
), even the
manufacturer in the centralized channel starts to give up some consumers
with the highest willingness-to-pay because of their large transaction costs.
That is to say, channel members have a triangle demand function in both
channel structures. For the manufacturer, the cost of increasing product
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quality to attract extra consumers is too high since consumer transaction
costs are very high because of a high t. Therefore, the manufacturer does
not have the incentive to increase the product quality in the decentralized
channel to overcome the double-marginalization effect.
It is necessary to compare the research in this chapter to Xu (2009). Xu
(2009) derives the possibility of higher product quality in a decentralized
channel than in a centralized channel due to the high skewness of consumer
distribution, which, as stated in the paper, may not happen in real mar-
kets. In contrast, the research in this chapter provides the conditions un-
der which the manufacturer offers higher product quality in a decentralized
channel than in a centralized channel with only uniform distribution on two
dimensions, without the necessity of requiring high skewness of consumer
distribution.
Next, I analyze the effects of consumer transaction costs on channel mem-
bers’ profits in different distribution channels. I report the main results in
the following proposition.
Proposition 3. (Channel members’ profits) When consumers are both ver-
tically and horizontally heterogeneous, in a decentralized channel, dpi(R)
∗
dt
> 0
and d(pi(M)
∗+pi(R)∗)
dt
> 0 when 3
32
< t < 8
75
; and dpi(M)
∗
dt
< 0 for any t. But in a
centralized channel,
dpi∗C
dt
< 0 for any t.
Surprisingly, a decentralized channel as a whole can benefit from an in-
crease of the unit transaction cost, which happens when the unit transaction
cost is intermediate ( 3
32
< t < 8
75
). The intuition is as follows. Recall that
from Proposition 2, when 3
32
< t < 8
75
, the manufacturer has a strong incen-
tive to provide higher product quality in the decentralized channel than in the
centralized channel. When t increases, the manufacturer has the incentive
to provide higher quality without increasing the wholesale price much. This
leads to a lower margin for the manufacturer, which alleviates the problem
of double-marginalization in the decentralized channel, leading to a better
coordination of the distribution channel. When offering the higher quality
product, the manufacturer incurs higher production cost and has a lower
profit margin. Consequently, the manufacturer is worse off from the unit
transaction cost increase. In contrast, the retailer benefits from the increas-
ing unit transaction cost due to the lower margin for the manufacturer. Al-
together, when the unit transaction cost increases, the benefit for the retailer
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is more than the loss for the manufacturer. Hence, the distribution channel
as a whole benefits from the increase of unit transaction cost. This finding
is counterintuitive since the conventional wisdom regards transaction cost in
any form as a drain or waste when the channel is considered as a closed sys-
tem, while this research shows that higher transaction cost can even benefit
the closed decentralized channel system.
It is noteworthy to mention that Proposition 1 shows that the effects of
consumer heterogeneity on the retailer’s profit are similar to the finding
dpi(R)∗
dt
> 0 in Proposition 3. The main difference is that when consumers
are heterogeneous only either vertically on their willingness-to-pay for prod-
uct quality or horizontally on their transaction costs, since there is no quality
increase effect with channel decentralization, the positive effect (i.e., with the
increase of t or decrease of a, the increase of the retailer’s profit) is not strong
enough to offset the negative effects on the manufacturer’s profit. Hence, the
total channel profit in the decentralized channel does not increase with the
increase of t or decrease of a.
Interestingly, the effects of the unit transaction cost increase are different
in the decentralized channel and in the centralized channel. As shown by
Tyagi (2004), an increase of the unit transaction cost always hurts a mo-
nopolist. Proposition 3 shows that the unit transaction cost increase can
actually benefit a retailer and the distribution channel when the channel is
decentralized. Thus, channel structure becomes an important moderator for
the effect of consumer transaction cost on a distribution channel. To compare
with the decentralized channel, we look at the case when 3
32
< t < 8
75
in the
centralized channel. Without an independent retailer, there is no separation
of the product quality decision and the retail price decision, and there is no
double-marginalization effect, so the manufacturer does not have an incen-
tive to offer product quality as high as in the decentralized channel. With
the increase of t, this leads to a decreasing demand as well as a decreasing
profit margin for the channel. Therefore, altogether, the centralized channel
gets worse off from the increase of t.
Again, it is important to note that the beneficial effect of the unit transac-
tion cost increase on the retailer and the distribution channel happens only
when the unit transaction cost is intermediate ( 3
32
< t < 8
75
). When the unit
transaction cost is either low or high (t ≤ 3
32
or t ≥ 8
75
), as explained earlier
for Proposition 2, the quality-enhancing effect of channel decentralization is
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no longer effective, and the profits for the manufacturer, the retailer, and
consequently the channel will decrease when t increases.
Next, I study how the quality-enhancing effect affects consumer and social
welfare in the decentralized channel, and report the most interesting result
in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. (Consumer and Social Welfare) When consumers are two-
dimensionally heterogeneous, in a decentralized channel,
dCS∗D
dt
> 0 and
dSW ∗D
dt
>
0 when 3
32
< t < 8
75
.
Proposition 4 shows that an increase of t may benefit consumers as a whole
because of the quality-enhancing effect in a decentralized channel. When
3
32
< t < 8
75
, Proposition 2 presents that when t increases, the manufacturer
in the decentralized channel has a strong incentive to offer higher product
quality than in the centralized channel to retain those consumers with a high
willingness-to-pay for quality in the market. In the meantime, the manufac-
turer keeps its margin low. The quality-enhancing effect gets even stronger
with the increase of t. Consequently, the increase of t actually benefits the
consumers at an aggregate level despite the higher consumer transaction
costs. Recall from Proposition 3, the decentralized channel’s profits increase
in t when 3
32
< t < 8
75
. Therefore, social welfare combining the channel profit
and consumer welfare increases with t when 3
32
< t < 8
75
.
It is important to note that the beneficial effect of quality increase on
consumer and social welfare only happens when the unit transaction cost
t is in the range of t ∈ ( 3
32
, 8
75
). When 8
75
≤ t < 4
25
, with the increase of
t, each consumer who purchases the product receives less surplus because
the quality-enhancing effect becomes weaker. Therefore, consumer welfare
decreases with t. Again, recall from Proposition 3, the decentralized channel’s
profits decrease in t when 8
75
≤ t < 4
25
. Therefore, social welfare decreases
with the increase when 3
32
< t < 8
75
.
3.4 Conclusion
Should a manufacturer always lower its product quality when selling in a de-
centralized channel than in a centralized channel as suggested by literature
(Jeuland and Shugan 1983; Villas-Boas 1998; Economides 1999)? Or can
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the quality of a product sold by a decentralized channel be even higher than
that of a product sold by a centralized channel as shown by anecdotal evi-
dence? By comparing the models in which consumers are heterogeneous on
only one dimension, vertically on their willingness-to-pay for product quality
or horizontally on their transaction costs, or on both dimensions, I study
the manufacturer’s product quality decisions in different channel structures
with different types of consumer heterogeneity. There are several interest-
ing results which are complements to extant literature and have important
managerial implications for marketing practice.
First, when consumers are heterogeneous either vertically on willingness-
to-pay for product quality or horizontally on transaction costs, channel de-
centralization leads to same or lower product quality, same or lower channel
profits, and same or lower consumer and social welfare. However, when
consumers are heterogeneous on both their willingness-to-pay for product
quality and transaction costs, a manufacturer may want to optimally offer
higher product quality when selling through an independent retailer than
when selling directly by itself.
Secondly, when consumers are heterogeneous on both their willingness-
to-pay for product quality and transaction costs, the decrease of consumer
transaction cost does not necessarily increase a firm’s profit. In a decentral-
ized channel, we show that a retailer can benefit and a manufacturer gets
hurt from the increase of consumer transaction cost. Interestingly, the re-
tailer can benefit more from the unit transaction cost increase than that the
manufacturer loses. Thus, the distribution channel as a whole can benefit
from the consumer transaction cost increase. An interesting implication of
this result is that if the retailer and the manufacturer can work out a transfer
payment agreement, both the manufacturer and the retailer can benefit from
higher consumer transaction costs. In addition, it is not necessarily a good
idea for a retailer to reduce consumer transaction costs since such a reduction
can hurt the retailer and the distribution channel.
Finally, when consumers are heterogeneous on both willingness-to-pay for
product quality and transaction costs, the decrease of consumer transaction
costs does not necessarily benefit consumers. With the separation of quality
decision and retail price decision in the decentralized channel, total consumer
surplus and social welfare may even decrease with the decrease of consumer
transaction costs. This result has important implications for public policy
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makers. Government interventions for reducing consumer transaction costs
may actually hurt consumers and the society as a whole.
I acknowledge some limitations of the research in this chapter. In this
chapter, consumers are uniformly distributed on both quality valuation and
transaction cost dimensions. In the future, it will be worthwhile to examine
the cases with different consumer distributions on either one of these two
dimensions or both dimensions. In addition, in this chapter, there is only
one manufacturer and one retailer. Future research can study competition
at either the upstream level, the downstream level, or both levels, when
consumers differ both horizontally and vertically. I am currently working on
some of these topics, and hope this research can inspire more interest in this
area.
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CHAPTER 4
TIPPING POLICY AND SIGNALING
SERVICE QUALITY
4.1 Introduction
A tip, also called gratuity, is a payment consumers voluntarily make in addi-
tion to the advertised transaction price. This definition depicts the tipping
practice as a unique phenomenon in markets in two ways. One is that the
tip amount is determined by consumers instead of firms, and the other is
that tips are the payments made in addition to prices set by firms. Some
typical tipping examples are, a passenger pays an extra amount after a taxi
ride on top of the trip price, a diner pays a tip after a meal besides the meal
price, and a traveler pays tips in addition to the hotel fee. The tipping prac-
tice has become prevalent in numerous service industries such as restaurants,
bars, cruises, taxis, and resorts. For instance, Lynn et al. (1993) report that
33 service professions involve tipping. In the United States, consumers pay
approximately $40 billion of tips a year in the food industry (Azar 2008).
In many service industries, executives and managers have been actively
managing the tipping behavior by choosing to adopt a tipping policy or non-
tipping policy (Lynn and Withiam 2008). Evans and Dave (1999) depict the
practice of different policies such as tipping policy at prominent U.S. resorts.
An interesting example of these differing policies can be found when, in
November 2006, Jay Porter, the owner of a restaurant in San Diego eliminated
the tipping policy in his restaurant. Two years later, his restaurant was
purchased and transformed into a high service oriented seafood restaurant,
which then reverted to the tipping policy (Wachter 2008). This example
reveals the commonly known phenomenon that firms with little or low-level
of service, such as fast-food restaurants and shuttle buses, usually do not
make active efforts to solicit tips. Moreover, firms with some or high-level
service, such as bars, upscale restaurants, and taxis, often notify consumers
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upfront that tips are appreciated.
Tipping policy serves two purposes, one is to motivate service providers
to offer high service, the other is to signal service quality. In this chapter, I
study how the tipping policy can signal service quality in service industries
where some consumers cannot directly assess the service quality before mak-
ing purchasing decisions. I call these consumers “uninformed consumers”
and call those who can ascertain the service quality “informed consumers”.
Specifically, I try to tackle two main issues. The first issue is while a firm
with high service quality optimally chooses to have a tipping policy when all
consumers can ascertain its service quality, whether it can use this policy to
distinguish itself from those with low service quality where some consumers
cannot ascertain its service quality.1 Throughout this chapter, I denote the
firm with high service quality as the high-type and the firm with low ser-
vice quality as the low-type. The second issue is the question of whether a
high-type firm still prefers to distinguish its type with a tipping policy when
optimally it should choose not to have a tipping policy if all consumers can
ascertain its service quality.
The tipping practice has been generally influenced by social norms, in
the sense that it guides consumers with the appropriate amount of tips to
pay at an average level although different consumers have varying levels of
individual generosity. In this chapter, I denote this average level with “con-
sumers’ generosity”. Consumers’ generosity may be different across different
industries. More importantly, the evolvement of social norms has resulted
in changes in the tipping amount over time. For instance, in early 1900s,
the average tip in restaurants in the United States was 10% of the food
price, while the average NYC tip in restaurants is 20% as of the year of
2009 (Bruni 2009). Furthermore, the tip amount a consumer gives usually is
directly related to service quality, which is defined broadly in this paper. Ser-
vice quality can have many dimensions, such as appropriate/inappropriate
lighting, adjustable/nonadjustable temperature, various timelines of chefs,
and attentiveness of the waiting staff. It is even possible that a consumer
may pay tips higher than his/her valuation of the consumption experience
(i.e., service quality). Azar (2004) discusses two possible situations where
this phenomenon can occur. The first is that “the value of the service to
1To distinguish itself means to send signals to those uninformed consumers about its
true service quality.
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different patrons can vary significantly, ... for some of them, this value can
be below the tip dictated by the social norms”, and the second is that “if the
worker can initiate the service and the buyer finds it too costly to refuse a
service, the buyer may have to leave a tip that is larger than his valuation of
the service.” Overtime, the increase of consumers’ generosity is so substan-
tial that it can even influence consumers’ purchasing behavior. Consumers
may even choose not to purchase the goods or services because they expect
to pay high tips.2 In this chapter, I study how social norms influence firms’
signaling strategy with tipping policy.
4.1.1 Summary of main results
I first show that under certain conditions the high-type firm can effectively
signal its service quality to uninformed consumers with a tipping policy and
the retail price as its optimal decisions under complete information (i.e., when
all consumers can ascertain the service quality). When consumers’ generosity
guided by social norms is low, it is profitable for a high-type firm to choose
to have a tipping policy under complete information. This is because the
low consumers’ generosity does not require the high-type firm to lower its
retail price substantially to accommodate consumers’ decisions on tips when
it chooses to have a tipping policy. While under incomplete information
(i.e. not all consumers can ascertain the service quality), if the ratio of in-
formed consumers to uninformed consumers is relatively high, the high-type
firm can follow the same strategy as under complete information, without
being mimicked by the low-type firm. The low-type firm does not benefit
from pretending to be the high-type by mimicking its strategy since the loss
from the high proportion of informed consumers outweighs the gain from the
low proportion of uninformed consumers. Therefore, the high-type firm can
distinguish itself from the low-type firm with its optimal decisions under com-
plete information. Moreover, when consumers’ generosity is intermediate, it
is still profitable for the high-type firm to choose to have a tipping policy
under complete information, with a heavily lowered retail price to accommo-
2For example, on the website http://dinersjournal.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/18/tipping-
and-the-recession/, consumers give comments such as “I have always tipped 20% as the
bottom line ... and haven’t changed my tipping behavior. I just eat out less.” “I will tip
15% for decent service, and if I cant afford to do so, I won’t go out to dinner.” “I believe
that one should not go out to eat unless one can afford to tip fairly.”
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date consumers’ tip payment. This low retail price makes it less attractive
for the low-type to mimic the high-type with less gains from the uninformed
consumers and the same loss from the informed consumers. Different from
the literature that pricing alone can signal product quality (e.g. Bagwell
and Riordan 1991; Srinivasan 1991; Chu 1992; Balanchander and Srinivasan
1994; Desai and Srinivasan 1995), I show in this chapter that, under certain
conditions, pricing alone can not signal the service quality when the tipping
policy is banned. Pricing can signal the service quality with the assistance
of the tipping policy.
I also show that under certain conditions the high-type firm prefers to
distort its price (i.e., away from the optimal one under complete informa-
tion) and have a tipping policy, rather than to have a non-tipping policy
and charge the complete information price, to signal its service quality. As
mentioned earlier, when consumers’ generosity is low, the high-type firm op-
timally chooses to have a tipping policy under complete information. Under
incomplete information, however, if the ratio of informed consumers to unin-
formed consumers is low, the high-type can no longer separate itself from the
low-type with a tipping policy on top of the complete information price. This
is because the low-type firm can charge the high-type’s complete information
price and adopt a tipping policy, profitably pretending to be its counterpart.
The low-type’s successful mimicry results from less loss of the informed con-
sumers because of the low proportion of informed consumers. To prevent
the low-type’s imitation, the high-type firm has to change either its optimal
price or its optimal policy, which both will negatively affect its profit. Since
changing the optimal price while keeping the tipping policy does not lead to
as strong effect as changing the optimal policy (to a non-tipping policy), the
high-type distorts its retail price with a tipping policy to effectively signal
itself.
In addition, I show that under certain conditions the high-type firm may
even strategically choose to have a tipping policy to signal its service quality
to uninformed consumers, although it is better off with a non-tipping policy
under complete information. When consumers’ generosity is high, the high-
type firm optimally chooses to have a non-tipping policy under complete in-
formation, since it otherwise would have to lower its retail price substantially
to accommodate consumers’ tip payment. However, This non-tipping policy
makes it easier for the low-type firm to mimic the high-type. This is because
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when observing the non-tipping policy, uninformed consumers will pay their
appreciation for service quality through normal retail price. When observing
the tipping policy, uninformed consumers will pay part of their appreciation
for service quality via tipping. If a low-type firm pretends to be the high-
type, it will not receive the tip after consumers’ consumption verification.
Therefore, it is more attractive for the low-type to mimic the high-type with
non-tipping policy, especially when the proportion of informed consumers is
low so there will not be much loss the informed consumers by charging a
high retail price. On the other hand, it is relatively more difficult for the
low-type firm to pretend to be its counterpart when the high-type adopts
the tipping policy. In other words, there is a tradeoff for the high-type firm
between a policy which is less effective but more difficult to be imitated, i.e.,
tipping policy, and a policy which is more effective but less difficult to be
imitated, i.e., non-tipping policy. When the ratio of informed consumers to
uninformed consumers is low, it is even more attractive for the low-type firm
to pretend to be high-type when it adopts a non-tipping policy. Hence, to
separate itself from the low-type, the high-type firm adopts the less effective
policy, i.e., tipping policy.
4.1.2 Related literature
The research in this chapter is related to three streams of literature. One
stream is research on tipping phenomenon in Marketing and Economics. This
stream of literature has mainly focused on empirical and experimental studies
(e.g. Lynn et al. 1993; Lynn 2003; Azar 2007).3 There are very few analytical
studies on tipping behavior in Marketing and Economics (e.g. Ben-Zion and
Karni 1977; Jacob and Page 1980; Schwartz 1997; Flath 2009). Ben-Zion and
Karni (1977) propose a leading explanation for the economic benefit of the
social norm of tipping, which was later further developed by Jacob and Page
(1980). Schwartz (1997) concludes that tipping may increase the firm’s profits
when two consumer segments coexist and differ in their demand functions and
their propensity to tip. Flath (2009) develops a model to explain the tipping
behavior in taxi industry and concludes that tipping amounts to Lindahl
pricing of the services of vacant cabs. The research in this chapter differs
3Lynn (2003) and Azar (2007) have offered excellent reviews on empirical studies about
tipping.
53
from the extant literature on tipping phenomenon with a new perspective.
I focus on how a high-type firm can use tipping policy as a signal device to
separate itself from a low-type firm in a market where consumers’ tipping
behavior is guided by social norms.
The second stream is signaling literature. There is an enormous amount of
literature on signaling with various signal devices, for instance, price (Wolin-
sky 1983; Tirole 1988; Bagwell and Riordan 1991; Srinivasan 1991; Chu
1992; Balachander and Srinivasan 1994; Judd and Riordan 1994; Desai and
Srinivasan 1995), advertising (Nelson 1974; Schmalensee 1978; Milgrom and
Roberts 1986; Bagwell and Ramey 1988; Zhao 2000; Linnemer 2002; Er-
dem et al. 2008), warranties (Spence 1977; Grossman 1981; Lutz 1989),
money-back guarantee (Moorthy and Srinivasan 1995), scarcity (Stock and
Balachander 2005), product safety (Daughety and Reinganum 1995), and
internet auction features (Li et al. 2009). My model contributes to the
signaling literature by demonstrating that tipping policy can be (or strategi-
cally be used as) an effective signal of service quality, especially under certain
conditions where pricing alone is not enough to separate the firm with high
service quality from the firm with low service quality.
The third stream of related literature is research on service quality in
Marketing. The majority of this stream of research is on measurement scales
of service quality (e.g. Parasuraman et al. 1988; Cronin, Jr. and Taylor
1992) and conceptual or empirical models (e.g. Gronroos 1984; Parasura-
man et al. 1985; Bolton and Drew 1991). One exception is the analyti-
cal paper by Bhargava and Sun (2008). Bhargava and Sun (2008) explore
the performance-contingent pricing schemes with long-term statistical per-
formance guarantees in IT sevices with the presence of uncertainty in service
quality. Differing from literature, the research in this chapter examines the
situation where some consumers can not assess service quality and how firms
can use tipping policy to signal their service quality by transferring part of
the final price decision to consumers.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2, I describe
the model, analyze the complete information case, followed by the analysis
of incomplete information case and discussions of equilibrium results. In
section 4.3, I discuss some model extension where some assumptions in the
main model are relaxed or changed. This chapter concludes with section 4.4.
Detailed derivations and proofs are included in Appendix.
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4.2 The model
In this research, I mainly follow the model setup in Bagwell and Riordan
(1991) where a firm has private information about its service quality. I
consider two possible levels of service quality s ∈ {sH , sL}, where sH > sL.
In the main model, service quality is assumed to be exogenously determined.
In the model extension, I allow firms to endogenously decide the service
quality. The marginal cost for the firm with high service quality sH (i.e. the
high-type firm) is cH = c > 0 and the marginal cost for the firm with low
service quality sL (i.e. the low-type firm) is normalized to be cL = 0 without
loss of generality. Besides the service quality, both types of firms have a
common product quality V . The firms make two decisions. One is to choose
to have a tipping policy or non-tipping policy. When it chooses to have a
tipping policy, the firm transfers part of the final price decision to consumers.
When it chooses to have a non-tipping policy, the firm decides the price by
itself. The other decision is to set the corresponding retail price (p) under
each policy. When there is a tie between a tipping policy and a non-tipping
policy, we assume that the firm will choose to have a non-tipping policy.
In the market, there are two segments of consumers with a total mass of
one. One segment consists of informed consumers with a size of α, who can
ascertain both the product quality (V ) and service quality (s). The other
segment consists of uninformed consumers with a size of 1 − α, who can
only be certain about the product quality (V ), and have the prior beliefs
(γ) about the distribution of the service quality (s). Mathematically, this
means that the uninformed consumers believe the service quality is high
with probability Prob(s = sH) = γ and the service quality is low with
probability Prob(s = sL) = 1 − γ. The uninformed consumers update their
prior beliefs about the uncertain service quality based on the specific policy,
tipping or non-tipping, and the retail price. Let b denote the uninformed
consumers’ updated beliefs,4 and su denote the perception of the uncertain
service quality based on the updated beliefs.
Consumers’ willingness-to-pay consists of two parts, one for the product
quality V and the other for the service quality s. Let θ(s − sL) denote
consumers’ valuation on service quality, where s ∈ {sH , sL} for the informed
consumers and s = su for the uninformed consumers. The index θ captures
4Prob(s = sH) = b, Prob(s = sL) = 1− b
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consumer heterogeneity in valuation on the service quality, which is assumed
to be uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. This heterogeneity exists in both
segments, the informed segment and the uninformed segment. The higher θ
a consumer has, the more he/she appreciates the high service quality sH . To
focus on the analysis of service quality, I assume that all consumers, including
both the informed and uninformed consumers, have the same willingness-to-
pay (V ) for the product quality.
When a firm chooses to have a non-tipping policy, consumers do not pay
tips for either type of service quality. When it chooses to have a tipping
policy, consumers’ tips depend on both their valuations on the service qual-
ity and social norms. Consumers’ heterogeneity in tipping behavior is also
captured by θ. The higher θ a consumer has, the more he/she will pay as
tips under tipping policy. While consumers are individually different with
respect to the tip amount, their behavior in general is guided by social norms,
which I call consumers’ generosity and denote with β. Consumers’ generosity
may be different across various service industries.5 Furthermore, I assume
that consumers’ tips are proportional to the perceived service quality. The
higher the perceived service quality, the more tips a consumer pays. Hence,
consumers’ tip amount under tipping policy is θ(s− sL)β where s ∈ {sH , sL}
for the informed consumers and s = su for the uninformed consumers. By
θ(s− sL)β, I implicitly assume that when the uncertain service quality (s) is
known to be low, that is, s = sL, all consumers will not pay tips even when
the firm has a tipping policy.
If a firm chooses to have the tipping policy, the informed consumers utility
function is defined as
uf = V + θ(s− sL)− p− θ(s− sL)β (4.1)
where the first two parts represent consumer θ’s valuation on product and
service quality, and the last two parts represent consumer θ’s payments of
retail price and tips.
For the uninformed consumer θ, his/her expected utility function is
Euv = V + θ(s
u − sL)− p− θ(su − sL)β (4.2)
5http://www.tipping.com/ has guides for tipping in different professions.
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where V , θ, p and sL have the same meanings as explained for the informed
consumers, and su is the updated level of the uncertain service quality based
on the updated beliefs b. Specifically, θ(su−sL) is the consumer θ’s expected
valuation on service quality, and θ(su− sL)β is his/her expected payment of
tips.6
If a firm chooses to have the non-tipping policy, the informed consumer
θ’s utility function is
uf = V + θ(s− sL)− p (4.3)
and the uninformed consumers expected utility function as
Euv = V + θ(s
u − sL)− p. (4.4)
An informed consumer will purchase one unit of the product if his/her
utility is non-negative. And an uninformed consumer will purchase one unit
of the product if his/her expected utility is non-negative, given the updated
beliefs (b) about the uncertain service quality. I assume that consumers
are notified about the tipping or non-tipping policy and retail price before
they make their purchasing decision.7 The timing of the game is defined
as follows: (1) The firm decides to have a tipping policy or a non-tipping
policy, and sets the retail price; 8 (2) The informed consumers make their
purchasing decision based on their utility functions given the specific policy,
tipping or non-tipping, and the retail price. The uninformed consumers make
their purchasing decision based on the expected utility functions given the
tipping or non-tipping policy, the retail price and their updated beliefs. (3)
All the consumers who purchased the product, consume and experience the
true service quality and make payments accordingly.9
I first look at the benchmark case where all consumers are informed about
the firm type. Then I examine the firm’s signaling strategy when some
6This expected payment of tips is considered before consumers make purchasing de-
cision, while the actual payment of tips depends on the verification of the true service
quality.
7For example, before a consumer takes a ride, either by taxi or by shuttle, he/she will
notice whether tips are expected. Another example is that before placing orders in a
restaurant, consumers will be able to observe the tipping policy if there is one.
8In the case there is service charge on top of the retail price, we consider the sum of
retail price and service charge as the real retail price.
9Under tipping policy, a consumer pays the retail price p and tips θβ(sH − sL) for the
high-type and pays only the retail price p for the low-type. Under non-tipping policy, a
consumer pays only the retail price p for both the high-type and low-type.
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consumers are uncertain about the firm type.
4.2.1 Complete information case (α = 1)
When all consumers are informed about the firm type, i.e. α = 1, consumers
make their purchasing decision based on their utility functions as defined
earlier in Equations (1) and (3) given the tipping/non-tipping policy and
retail price. Under complete information, the low-type firm is indifferent
between tipping and non-tipping policy with the maximum profit piL = V
and adopts a non-tipping policy according to the tie-breaking rule as specified
before.10
If the high-type firm chooses to have a non-tipping policy, based on the
utility function in Equation (3), consumers with θ such that V +θ(sH−sL)−
p ≥ 0 will purchase the product, so its demand function is DHn = 1− p−V
sH−sL
and its profit function is
piHn = (p− c)(1− p− V
sH − sL ) (4.5)
The optimal retail price (pHn∗) and profits (piHn∗) are
pHn∗ =
{
c+V+sH−sL
2
, if sH − sL ≥ V − c;
V, if sH − sL < V − c.
(4.6)
piHn∗ =
{
(V−c+sH−sL)2
4(sH−sL) , if sH − sL ≥ V − c;
V − c, if sH − sL < V − c.
(4.7)
When the high-type firm chooses to have the non-tipping policy, its optimal
retail price pHn∗ increases with the increase of the service quality difference
sH − sL, if it is relatively high (i.e. sH − sL ≥ V − c). The market is not
fully covered, leaving the low-end consumers (i.e. consumers with low θ)
uncovered. If the service quality difference is relatively low (i.e. sH − sL <
V − c), the market is fully covered.
Next, I examine the high-type firm’s pricing decision if it chooses to have
a tipping policy. Based on the utility function as defined in Equation (1),
10The low-type’s profit function under tipping policy as well as non-tipping policy is
piLt = piLn = p × 1 if p ≤ V and piLt = piLn = 0 if p > V . So the optimal decision is
pL = V with non-tipping policy according to the tie-breaking rule defined before.
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the firm’s demand function is
DHt =
{
1− p−V
(sH−sL)(1−β) , if β < 1;
V−p
(sH−sL)(β−1) , if β > 1.
(4.8)
It is noteworthy to mention that the demand functions are different de-
pending on the value of consumers’ generosity β. This is because with dif-
ferent values of β, the profitable consumers for the firm are different. Specif-
ically, when β < 1, he high-end consumers (i.e., with high θ) are relatively
more profitable for the firm than the low-end consumers since the tip amount
a consumer pays is less than the value he/she gets from the service quality.11
When β > 1, the low-end consumers (i.e., with low θ) are more easily at-
tracted by the firm than the high-end consumers since the tip amount a
consumer pays is more than the value he/she gets from the service quality.12
Consequently, the high-type firm’s profit function is written as
piHt =
 (p− c)× (1−
p−V
(sH−sL)(1−β)) +
∫ 1
p−V
(sH−sL)(1−β)
(sH − sL)βθdθ, if β < 1;
(p− c) V−p
(sH−sL)(β−1) +
∫ V−p
(sH−sL)(β−1)
0 (sH − sL)βθdθ, if β > 1.
(4.9)
where the first part refers to the firm’s revenue due to consumers’ payment
of retail price, and the second part is the firm’s revenue due to consumers’
payment of tips. I assume that the firm gets the full tip payment in the main
model and the case that servers and firms share tips will be discussed later
in the model extension.
Maximizing its profit with respect to the retail price, the high-type firm’s
11When β = 1, demand function is DHt = 1 if p ≤ V and DHt = 0 if p > V .
12One can understand β as a parameter describing a consumer’s tip as percentage of
his/her appreciation of the service quality. Then when β is low (high), for instance β < 1
(β > 1), it means that consumers in general pay a relatively low (high) tip comparing to
the value they get from the service quality. A specific example for the low β is dining in
an upscale restaurant where diners highly value the environment and service. An example
for the high β is taxi rides within city where passengers do not need much extra service
from the drivers.
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optimal retail price (pHt∗) and profits (piHt∗) under tipping policy are
pHt∗ =

(1−β)c+V+(1−β)2(sH−sL)
2−β , if β < 1, (1− β)(sH − sL) ≥ V − c;
V, if β < 1, (1− β)(sH − sL) < V − c;
V − (β − 1)(sH − sL), if 1 ≤ β ≤ 2;
(1−β)c+V
2−β , if β > 2, (β − 2)(sH − sL) ≥ V − c;
V − (β − 1)(sH − sL), if β > 2, (β − 2)(sH − sL) < V − c.
(4.10)
piHt∗ =

(V−c+sH−sL)2
2(2−β)(sH−sL) , if β < 1, (1− β)(sH − sL) ≥ V − c;
V − c+ β
2
(sH − sL), if β < 1, (1− β)(sH − sL) < V − c;
V − c+ (1− β
2
)(sH − sL), if 1 ≤ β ≤ 2;
(V−c)2
2(β−2)(sH−sL) , if β > 2, (β − 2)(sH − sL) ≥ V − c;
V − c+ (1− β
2
)(sH − sL), if β > 2, (β − 2)(sH − sL) < V − c.
(4.11)
Unlike the case of non-tipping policy, when the high-type firm adopts a
tipping policy, its optimal retail price pHt∗ does not necessarily increase with
the increase of the service quality difference sH − sL. It may even decrease
with the increase of sH−sL, depending on the value of consumers’ generosity
β. For instance, when β is high, i.e., β > 1, since consumers in general pay
tips higher than their valuation on the service quality, the high-type firm
needs to lower its retail price substantially to attract consumers. The higher
sH − sL, the more consumers pay as tips, and the more the firm needs to
decrease its retail price to accommodate consumers’ tips. Hence, the retail
price pHt∗ may decrease with the increase of sH − sL.
By comparing the high-type firm’s profits when it chooses to have a tipping
policy and when it chooses to have a non-tipping policy, I summarize the
high-type firm’s optimal policy decision under complete information in the
following Lemma.
Lemma 1. Under complete information, the high-type firm should choose a
tipping policy when consumers’ generosity is low, i.e., 0 < β < 3
2
+ V−c
sH−sL −
(V−c)2
2(sH−sL)2 if sH − sL ≥ V − c and 0 < β < 2 if sH − sL < V − c. It
should choose a non-tipping policy when consumers’ generosity is high, i.e.,
β > 3
2
+ V−c
sH−sL −
(V−c)2
2(sH−sL)2 if sH − sL ≥ V − c and β > 2 if sH − sL < V − c.
Lemma 1 shows that a high-type firm’s decision to adopt a tipping policy
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because of the high consumer generosity and relatively high quality difference. Especially, when
the proportion of the informed consumers is high, that is, α > 1− 4V (sH−sL)
(sH−sL+V )2−c2 , the low-type will
not find it profitable to pretend to be high-type due to the loss of the informed consumers in case
of mimicking with a high retail price pHn∗.
Proposition 4: When β > 2 and sH − sL < V − c, there does not exist a separating equilibrium
satisfying intuitive criterion. The strategy pair {(non− tipping, V ), (non− tipping, V )} is a pooling
equilibrium together with the uninformed consumers’ updated beliefs b(non− tipping, V ) = γ.
According to Lemma 1, we know that when consumers’ generosity level is high β > 2 and quality
difference is relatively low sH − sL < V − c, the high-type firm’s optimal decisions under complete
information are to adopt non-tipping policy and charge retail price pHn∗ = V , which is the same
as the low-type firm’s decisions when revealing its true type. So the high-type would not benefit
if deviating from this strategy in order to prevent the low-type to imitate. Hence, no separating
equilibrium satisfying intuitive criterion exists and {(non− tipping, V ), (non− tipping, V )} is the
pooling equilibrium strategy, with the uninformed consumers’ posterior beliefs the same as their
prior beliefs, that is, b(non− tipping, V ) = γ.
3. Model Extension
3.1. Three possible types
There are three possible types of firms with different quality levels, defined as high-typeH, medium-
type M and low-type L. We assume that uninformed consumers have the prior belief that the firm
is each type with the same probability γh = γm = γl =
1
3
.
A separating equilibrium exists when (1) medium-type M can separate itself from the low-type
L; and (2) high-type H can separate itself from both the medium-type M and low-type L. A
possible separating equilibrium is H adopts non-tipping policy and charges ph, M adopts tipping
policy and charges pm, and L adopts non-tipping policy and charges pl.
Range of service quality; heterogeneous on both product quality and service quality; different
consumer generosity levels for informed and uninformed consumers
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Figure 4.1: The effect of β and V−c
sH−sL on the high-type firm’s
tipping/non-tipping decision
or non-tipping policy depends on consumers’ generosity level (β) and the
service quality difference (sH − sL). Surprisingly, the firm will only benefit
from adopting a tipping policy if in general consumers are not so generous,
i.e. β is low as shown in Figure 4.1. The driving force is as follows. When
the high-type firm chooses to adopt a tipping policy, comparing to the non-
tipping policy case, it has to lower its retail price to accommodate consumers’
tipping behavior since consumers know that they will pay tips in addition
to the retail price. The extent of lowering the retail price increases with the
increase of consumers’ generosity β. When consumers’ generosity (β) is low,
the high-type firm lowers its retail price slightly under the tipping policy
than under the non-tipping policy. So the loss due to the lowered retail price
is easily compensated by the gain from consumers’ tips and the high-type
firm benefits from the consumers’ involvement in pricing decision. However,
when consumers’ generosity (β) is high, the high-type firm needs to lower its
retail price substantially under the tipping policy than under the non-tipping
policy, since consumers expect to pay much higher tips.13 Hence the loss due
to the substantially lowered retail price can no longer be compensated by
13θ(sH − sL)β − θ(sH − sL) ≥ 12 (sH − sL)
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the gain from consumers’ tips. Therefore, the high-type firm is better off
by choosing to have a non-tipping policy when consumers’ generosity (β) is
high.
4.2.2 Incomplete information case (α < 1)
One can understand the complete information refers to the case where the
ratio of informed to uninformed consumers is infinity, that is, there is no
uninformed consumers in the market. When uninformed consumers appear
in the market, the ratio decreases. In the following, I first discuss how to
derive separating equilibria, then I derive the separating equilibrium results
under different market conditions; finally I discuss the conditions under which
no separating equilibrium exists.
I. The characterization of separating equilibrium
The high-type firm can effectively separate itself from the low-type firm when
it maximizes its profits with respect to a specific policy, tipping or non-
tipping, and retail price subject to two constraints: (1) the low-type firm
does not have the incentive to mimic the high-type’s policy and retail price;
and (2) the high-type does not benefit from deviating to other strategies.
All consumers observe the firm’s policy, tipping or non-tipping policy and
retail price, before they make their purchasing decision. While the informed
consumers know the true service quality s, the uninformed consumers up-
date their beliefs γ to b using Bayes’ rule. To characterize the separating
equilibrium, I define two sets of strategies, M and N , to represent the two
constraints discussed above respectively.
The strategies in M represent those satisfying constraint (1). They give
the low-type firm a lower profit (pi{sL, 1, p,X}) under the most favorable
beliefs, i.e., the uninformed consumers believe it is high-type b = 1, than
the maximum profit (pi{sL, 0, p, x}) obtainable under the worst beliefs, i.e.,
revealing its true type b = 0.
M = {(X, p)|pi{sL, 1, p,X} ≤ (maxpi{sL, 0, p, x} = V )} (4.12)
where X ∈ {tipping, non− tipping}.
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If X = tipping, based on the utility functions in Equations (1) and (2),
the low-type firm’s demand function (D{sL, 1, p, t}) under the most favorable
beliefs (b = 1) is
D{sL, 1, p, t} =

1, if p ≤ V, β < 1;
α + (1− α) V−p
(sH−sL)(β−1) , if p ≤ V, β > 1;
(1− α)(1− p−V
(sH−sL)(1−β)), if V < p < V1, β < 1;
0, if p > V1, β < 1;
0, if p > V, β > 1;
(4.13)
where V1 = V + (sH − sL)(1− β).
Consequently, the low-type firm’s profit function under the most favorable
beliefs (b = 1) is
pi{sL, 1, p, t} =

p, if p ≤ V, β < 1;
p[α + (1− α) V−p
(sH−sL)(β−1) ], if p ≤ V, β > 1;
p(1− α)(1− p−V
(sH−sL)(1−β)), if V < p < V1, β < 1;
0, if p > V1, β < 1;
0, if p > V, β > 1.
(4.14)
If X = non − tipping, based on the utility functions in Equations (3)
and (4), the low-type firm’s demand function (D{sL, 1, p, n}) under the most
favorable beliefs (b = 1) is
D{sL, 1, p, n} =

1, if p ≤ V ;
(1− α)(1− p−V
sH−sL ), if V < p < V + (sH − sL);
0, if p > V + (sH − sL).
(4.15)
Consequently, the low-type firm’s profit function under the most favorable
beliefs (b = 1) is
pi{sL, 1, p, n} =

p, if p ≤ V ;
p(1− α)(1− p−V
sH−sL ), if V < p < V + (sH − sL);
0, if p > V + (sH − sL).
(4.16)
A necessary condition for a separating equilibrium to exist is that a low-
type firm prefers to reveal its type rather than pretend to be of the high-
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type by imitating the high-type’s strategy. As discussed earlier, the highest
profit the low-type firm can obtain when revealing its true type is piL = V .
The low-type is interested in mimicking the high-type when it can persuade
the uninformed consumers with the high willingness-to-pay for service and
tip under tipping policy, i.e., high θ to purchase. However, when doing
so, the low-type needs to consider the possible loss of the other segment
of consumers, that is, the informed consumers, since these consumers will
not purchase when the low-type pretends to be the high-type with a high
retail price and tipping policy, unless the retail price is low enough. So,
the low-type will mimic the high-type’s strategy when pi{sL, 1, p, t} = p(1−
α)(1 − p−V
(sH−sL)(1−β)) > pi
L = V under tipping policy and pi{sL, 1, p, n} =
p(1− α)(1− p−V
sH−sL ) > pi
L = V under non-tipping policy.
The strategies in N represent those satisfying constraint (2). They give
the high-type firm a higher profit under the most favorable beliefs, i.e., the
uninformed consumers believe it is high-type, than the maximum profit ob-
tainable under the worst beliefs, i.e, the uninformed consumers believe it is
low-type. It means that the high-type should not find it profitable to deviate
from its equilibrium strategy. When an off-equilibrium strategy is observed,
we specify that the uninformed consumers believe that the firm is low-type.
N = {(X, p)|pi{sH , 1, p,X} ≥ maxpi{sH , 0, p, x}} (4.17)
The high-type firm’s profit function under the most favorable beliefs is the
same as in the complete information case in previous section. If X = tipping,
according to the utility functions in Equations (1) and (2), the high-type
firm’s demand function under the worst beliefs is
D{sH , 0, p, t} =

1, if β < 1, p ≤ V ;
α(1− p−V
(sH−sL)(1−β)), if β < 1, p > V ;
α V−p
(sH−sL)(β−1) + (1− α), if β > 1, p ≤ V ;
0, if β > 1, p > V .
(4.18)
The high-type’s profit function under the worst beliefs pi{sH , 0, p, t} is
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pi{sH , 0, p, t} =

(p− c)× 1 + ∫ 1
0
(sH − sL)βθdθ, if β < 1, p ≤ V ;
R1 + T1, if β < 1, p > V ;
R1 + T2 + T
′
2, if β > 1, p ≤ V ;
0, if β > 1, p > V ;
(4.19)
where R refers to the profit from charging retail price and T refers to revenue
from tips.14
If X = non− tipping, according to utility functions in Equations (3) and
(4), the high-type firm’s demand function under the worst beliefs is
D{sH , 0, p, n} =

1, if p ≤ V ;
α(1− p−V
sH−sL ), if V < p < V + (sH − sL);
0, if p > V + (sH − sL).
(4.20)
The high-type’s profit function under the worst beliefs pi{sH , 0, p, n} is
pi{sH , 0, p, n} =

p− c, if p ≤ V ;
(p− c)α(1− p−V
sH−sL ), if V < p < V + (sH − sL);
0, if p > V + (sH − sL).
(4.21)
A separating equilibrium satisfying intuitive criterion requires that (i)
(XH , pH) maximizes the high-type’s profit, (ii) (XH , pH) ∈ M ∩N , and (iii)
(XH , pH) 6= (XL, pL). I first discuss the case when XH 6= XL. A strategy
pair {(tipping, pH), (non− tipping, pL)} is a separating equilibrium when (1)
each strategy is optimal given the uninformed consumers’ updated beliefs;
and (2) the uninformed consumers’ updated beliefs are consistent with Bayes’
rule. The uninformed consumers’ updated beliefs are b(tipping, pH) = 1 and
b(non− tipping, pL) = 0.
14R1 = (p − c) × [α(1 − p−V(sH−sL)(1−β) )], T1 = α
∫ 1
p−V
(sH−sL)(1−β)
(sH − sL)βθdθ, R2 =
(p − c) × [α V−p(sH−sL)(β−1) , T2 = (1 − α)] + α
∫ V−p(sH−sL)(β−1)
0 (sH − sL)βθdθ, and T ′2 = (1 −
α)
∫ 1
0
(sH − sL)βθdθ.
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II. The separating equilibrium
According to Lemma 1, the high-type firm’s optimal decision is to adopt a
tipping policy under complete information when consumers’ generosity (β)
is low. In the following proposition, I summarize the conditions under which
the strategy pair {(tipping, pHt∗), (non− tipping, V )} is a separating equilib-
rium satisfying intuitive criterion with the uninformed consumers’ updated
beliefs b(tipping, pHt∗) = 1 and b(non− tipping, V ) = 0. Please refer to the
Appendix for the detailed proofs.
Proposition 1. A strategy pair {(tipping, pHt∗), (non − tipping, V )} is a
separating equilibrium satisfying intuitive criterion with the uninformed con-
sumers’ updated beliefs b∗(tipping, pHt∗) = 1 and b∗(non − tipping, V ) = 0,
if one of the following conditions holds:
(i) 0 < β < 1, (1 − β)(sH − sL) > V − c and α > max{0, α}, where
α = 1− (2−β)2(sH−sL)V
[V+(1−β)c+(1−β)2(sH−sL)](sH−sL+V−c)
(ii) 0 < β < 1 and (1− β)(sH − sL) < V − c
(iii) 1 < β < 3
2
+ V−c
sH−sL −
(V−c)2
2(sH−sL)2 and sH − sL > V − c
(iv) 1 < β < 2 and sH − sL < V − c.
Proposition 1 shows that under certain conditions, the high-type firm can
distinguish itself with its optimal decisions, tipping policy and retail price
pHt∗, under complete information. Specifically, condition (i) refers to the
case when the high-type firm adopts a tipping policy with its retail price
pHt∗ higher than V , the value of the product, and the proportion of the
informed consumers is high. Due to the low consumers’ generosity (β < 1)
and relatively high after-tip valuation of the service quality, i.e., (1−β)(sH−
sL) > V − c, it is profitable for the high-type firm to focus on the high-
end consumers (i.e., with high θ) rather than covering the whole market.
Therefore, the high-type firm does not need to lower its retail price much
to accommodate consumers’ tips, which leads to the optimal retail price
pHt∗ higher than V . This high retail price is attractive for the low-type
to pretend to be its counterpart since it can earn high profit margin from
those uninformed consumers who would purchase the product even with the
consideration for paying tips. However, the high proportion of the informed
consumers, α > α, makes mimicry unattractive to the low-type firm because
of the loss of the informed consumers and not enough uninformed consumers
66
to be mistakenly attracted. When the unattractiveness of high proportion
of informed consumers offsets the attractiveness of high retail price, the low-
type does not find it more profitable to imitate the high-type’s strategy than
revealing its true type. While the after-tip valuation of service quality is
relatively low, (1− β)(sH − sL) < V − c, as in condition (ii), it is profitable
for the high-type firm to cover the full market under complete information
with a retail price equal to V . However, it is still not attractive for the
low-type firm to pretend to be high-type because doing so will not bring it a
higher profit.
Conditions (iii) and (iv) refer to the case when the high-type firm chooses
to adopt a tipping policy with its retail price lower than V . Due to the high
level of consumers’ generosity (β > 1), to adopt a tipping policy, the high-
type firm needs to allow big payment space for consumers’ tips and has to
lower its retail price substantially to attract consumers. This low retail price,
pHt∗ < V , prevents the low-type firm from imitating. This is because all
consumers, including informed and uninformed consumers, would purchase
the product. However, after the consumption experience of verifying the true
service quality, no consumer would pay any amount of tip.
Proposition 1 also demonstrates that the tipping policy and pricing to-
gether signal the service quality sH for the high-type firm. Considering the
large amount of signaling literature where pricing alone can signal the prod-
uct quality, one would naturally ask the question whether pricing alone can
signal the service quality in this chapter. That is, if tipping policy is banned,
whether the high-type firm can still signal its service quality with its pric-
ing decision. Recall the analysis where the high-type firm chooses to have
the non-tipping policy, its pricing decision and optimal profits under com-
plete information are shown in Equations (6) and (7). Straightforwardly, if
sH − sL < V − c, there does not exist a separating equilibrium satisfying in-
tuitive criterion where pricing alone is the signaling device. However, when
tipping policy is allowed, the high-type firm can signal its service quality
whenever consumers’ generosity is not too high, that is, β < 2. Part of con-
dition (ii) and condition (iii) demonstrate the parameter areas where on the
one hand, if tipping policy is banned, pricing alone will not be able to signal
the high-type firm’s service quality; on the other hand, if tipping policy is
allowed, the high-type firm can signal its service quality by tipping policy
and pricing decision.
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Next, I look at the cases where tipping policy is the optimal choice under
complete information for the high-type firm but it can not use the full infor-
mation price decision pHt∗ to separate itself from the low-type firm. As noted
in condition (i) in Proposition 1, if 0 < β < 1 and (1− β)(sH − sL) > V − c,
only when the proportion of informed consumers is high, that is α > α, the
high-type firm can distinguish itself with tipping policy and full information
price pHt∗. When the proportion of informed consumers is low, that is, α < α,
the strategy (tipping, pHt∗) is too lucrative for the low-type firm to imitate.
This is because there are enough uninformed consumers in the market to
be persuaded, that is, 1 − α > 1 − α. The high-type firm needs to take a
further step to protect itself, either by changing its retail price and keeping
the tipping policy or by changing to non-tipping policy. When keeping the
tipping policy, the high-type firm can optimally distort its price upwards to p
or downwards to p where p =
V+(sH−sL)(1−β)+
q
[V+(sH−sL)(1−β)]2− 4V (sH−sL)(1−β)1−α
2
and p =
V+(sH−sL)(1−β)−
q
[V+(sH−sL)(1−β)]2− 4V (sH−sL)(1−β)1−α
2
If the high-type firm gives up the tipping policy and tries to signal itself
with a non-tipping policy, when α ≤ 1− 4V (sH−sL)
(sH−sL+V )2−c2 , the high-type cannot
effectively signal its type by non-tipping policy together with the full infor-
mation price pHn∗ since the low-type can profitably imitate it. Similar as the
price distortion in the tipping policy case, the high-type can also separate
itself with a distorted price with non-tipping policy when the full information
price can not do so. I can show that the high-type’s profit under distorted
price with tipping policy is higher than the one under distorted price with
non-tipping policy.
When α > 1 − 4V (sH−sL)
(sH−sL+V )2−c2 , the high-type can also signal its type with
non-tipping policy together with the full information price pHn∗. The ques-
tion then is the high-type should signal with tipping policy and distorted
price or with non-tipping and full information price. I compare the high-
type’s profits under two situations and reach the following conclusion.
Proposition 2. When 0 < β < 1, (1 − β)(sH − sL) > V − c and α < α,
the strategy pair {(tipping, p), (non − tipping, V )} or {(tipping, p), (non −
tipping, V )} , is a separating equilibrium satisfying intuitive criterion with
the uninformed consumers’ updated beliefs b∗(tipping, p) = 1 and b∗(non −
tipping, V ) = 0.
Proposition 2 shows that when the proportion of the informed consumers
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is low, α < α, the high-type cannot signal its type with the tipping policy
together with the full information price. To prevent the low-type’s imitation,
the high-type distorts its full information price upwards to p or downwards
to p. The distorted price together with the tipping policy still gives the high-
type a higher profit than the one the full information price (or distorted price)
with the non-tipping policy can lead to. One can notice the higher the α is,
the less the high-type firm needs to distort its retail price. This is because
the higher the α, the more informed consumers among all the consumers,
the more the low-type will lose when mimicking the high-type’s strategy
with a retail price higher than V . So the less the the high-type needs to
change away from its optimal strategy to discourage the low-type to imitate.
Although the high-type may be able to signal its type by adopting a non-
tipping policy together with full information price under certain conditions,
i.e., α > 1− 4V (sH−sL)
(sH−sL+V )2−c2 , the high-type is still better off by signaling with
tipping policy and distorted retail price.
So far, I have discussed all the cases where the high-type firm would prefer
a tipping policy under complete information. In the following, I look at
the cases where the high-type firm would prefer a non-tipping policy under
complete information to examine whether the high-type will be induced to
use the tipping policy to signal its type.
When 3
2
+ V−c
sH−sL −
(V−c)2
2(sH−sL)2 < β < 2 and V − c < sH − sL, according to
Lemma 1, the high-type firm’s optimal policy is non-tipping under complete
information. It can distinguish itself from low-type by its optimal decision
(non − tipping, pHn∗) under complete information when the proportion of
informed consumers is high, that is, α > 1 − 4V (sH−sL)
(sH−sL+V )2−c2 . However, when
the proportion of informed consumers is low, α ≤ 1 − 4V (sH−sL)
(sH−sL+V )2−c2 , the
high-type firm can no longer separate itself by the optimal decision (non −
tipping, pHn∗) under complete information since the low-type will not lose
too much from losing the informed consumers. In order to successfully signal
its type, the high-type firm can either distort its retail price and keep the
non-tipping policy or change to tipping policy with the appropriate retail
price. I compare the high-type firm’s profits between these two choices, and
have the following conclusion.
Proposition 3. When 3
2
+ V−c
sH−sL −
(V−c)2
2(sH−sL)2 < β < β, sH − sL > V − c,
α ≤ 1 − 4V (sH−sL)
(sH−sL+V )2−c2 and c <
√
(sH − sL + V )2 − 4V (sH−sL)1−α , the high-type
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firm strategically signals itself with the strategy (tipping, pHt∗) rather than
using the non-tipping policy, although it is better off with non-tipping policy
under complete information.15
Surprisingly, Proposition 3 shows that a high-type firm may strategically
choose to adopt a tipping policy in order to distinguish itself from low-type,
although this strategy is not its optimal decision even under complete in-
formation. The driving forces are as follows. As stated in Lemma 1, when
consumers’ generosity is high β > 3
2
+ V−c
sH−sL −
(V−c)2
2(sH−sL)2 and the service
quality difference is relatively high sH − sL > V − c, the high-type firm’s
optimal decision is to adopt the non-tipping policy and charge a retail price
of pHn∗ = V+c+sH−sL
2
> V . The tipping policy is no longer efficient for the
high-type firm because it needs to sacrifice its retail price substantially to
accommodate consumers’ tips as well as to attract the high-end consumers
(i.e., with high θ) in the market. However, the high-type’s optimal policy,
the non-tipping policy, also makes it easier for the low-type to pretend to be
high-type. This is because when the uninformed consumers observe a non-
tipping policy and believe it as high-type, they do not need to consider the
payment of tips when they make purchasing decision. Hence the retail price
can be higher. Therefore, it is more profitable for the low-type to mimic,
especially when the proportion of the informed consumers is low so there
will not be much loss from losing the informed consumers by charging a high
retail price. On the other hand, it is relatively more difficult for the low-type
to pretend when the high-type adopts a tipping policy. Therefore, there is
a tradeoff for the high-type between a less effective but more difficult to be
imitated policy, i.e., tipping policy, and a more effective but less difficult
to be imitated policy, i.e., non-tipping policy. When the proportion of the
informed consumers is low, it is even more attractive for the low-type to pre-
tend to be high-type when it adopts non-tipping policy. Hence, to separate
itself from the low-type, the high-type strategically adopts a less effective
policy, tipping policy.
Above I have examined the cases where pricing alone can not signal the
service quality. In the following, I briefly discuss the cases where pricing alone
can separate different types of service quality. If a separating equilibrium
15β = 2− 2αV(1−α)(sH−sL) −
c[sH−sL−V+
q
(sH−sL+V )2− 4V (sH−sL)1−α ]
(sH−sL)2
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exists with XH = XL = non− tpping, then pricing alone can be an effective
signal. The strategy pair {(Non − tipping, pHn∗), (Non − tipping, V )} is a
separating equilibrium with uninformed consumers’ updated beliefs b(Non−
tipping, pHn∗) = 1 and b(Non − tipping, V ) = 0 when (1) 3
2
+ V−c
sH−sL −
(V−c)2
2(sH−sL)2 < β < β, sH − sL > V − c and α < 1 −
4V (sH−sL)
(sH−sL+V )2−c2 , c ≥√
(sH − sL + V )2 − 4V (sH−sL)1−α ; (2) β < β < 2, sH − sL > V − c; or (3) β >
3
2
+ V−c
sH−sL −
(V−c)2
2(sH−sL)2 , sH − sL > V − c and α > 1−
4V (sH−sL)
(sH−sL+V )2−c2 . The high-
type would prefer non-tipping policy when it needs to lower its retail price
substantially to use tipping policy, because of the high consumer generosity
and relatively high quality difference. Especially, when the proportion of the
informed consumers is high, that is, α > 1 − 4V (sH−sL)
(sH−sL+V )2−c2 , the low-type
will not find it profitable to pretend to be high-type due to the loss of the
informed consumers in case of mimicking with a high retail price pHn∗.
Proposition 4. When β > 2 and sH − sL < V − c, there does not ex-
ist a separating equilibrium satisfying intuitive criterion. The strategy pair
{(non−tipping, V ), (non−tipping, V )} is a pooling equilibrium together with
the uninformed consumers’ updated beliefs b(non− tipping, V ) = γ.
According to Lemma 1, when consumers’ generosity level is high β > 2
and quality difference is relatively low sH − sL < V − c, the high-type firm’s
optimal decisions under complete information are to adopt a non-tipping
policy and charge retail price pHn∗ = V , which is the same as the low-type
firm’s decisions when revealing its true type. So the high-type would not
benefit if it deviates from this strategy in order to prevent the low-type
to imitate. Hence, no separating equilibrium satisfying intuitive criterion
exists and {(non− tipping, V ), (non− tipping, V )} is the pooling equilibrium
strategy, with the uninformed consumers’ posterior beliefs the same as their
prior beliefs, that is, b(non− tipping, V ) = γ.
4.3 Model Extension
4.3.1 Endogenous decision on service quality
In the main model of this chapter, I assume that service quality is exogenously
determined. In this model extension section, I allow a firm to endogenously
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decide its service quality before it makes the decision on its tipping/non-
tipping policy. In doing so, the firm incurs a fixed cost of offering the service
quality s. Following the literature on cost of product quality (e.g. Moorthy
1988; Desai 2001; Tyagi 2004), I assume this cost is a quadratic function of
service quality, that is, f = s2. To simplify the analysis, I normalize the low
service quality sL = 0. To focus on the effect of consumers’ generosity β
on the high-type firm’s service quality decision and simplify the analysis, I
assume that V −c = 0 to concentrate on the cases where the service quality is
relatively high comparing to the product quality, such as (1− β)(sH − sL) ≥
V − c = 0 in Equations (10) and (11).
Unlike the main model with exogenous service quality, when firms endoge-
nously decide the service quality, this decision affects the subsequent decisions
on tipping or non-tipping policy and the corresponding retail price. Stated
differently, the high-type firm decides its tipping or non-tipping policy and
retail price given its decision on its service quality. Under complete informa-
tion, the high-type firm will choose to adopt a tipping policy when sH > 0
and 0 < β < 3
2
, and choose to adopt a non-tipping policy when sH > 0 and
β > 3
2
. Based on backwards induction, I work one step further to maximize
the high-type firm’s profit with respect to the service quality sH given what
we have in the main model. Hence the optimal service quality is s∗H =
1
4(2−β) ,
when β ≤ 1 and is s∗H = 12 − β4 when 1 < β < 32 . When β > 32 , its optimal
service quality is s∗H =
1
8
. I summarize the high-type firm’s optimal decisions
on service quality and tipping/non-tipping policy in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. When the high-type firm endogenously decides its service quality,
under complete information, its service quality increases with the increase
of consumers’ generosity β when β < 1 and decreases with the increase of
consumers’ generosity β when 1 < β < 3
2
, and the firm chooses to have a
tipping policy when 0 < β < 3
2
. When β > 3
2
, its service quality remains
constant with the increase of consumers’ generosity and the firm chooses to
have a non-tipping policy.
Next, I look at the case of incomplete information to examine the effect of
the presence of the uninformed consumers on the high-type firm’s decision
on its service quality. First, under the conditions in Proposition 1, since the
high-type firm can distinguish itself with its optimal strategy (tipping, pHt∗)
under complete information, its service quality should be the same as the
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one under complete information, that is, si∗H = s
∗
H . Secondly, under the con-
ditions in Proposition 2, since the high-type firm has distorted its optimal
retail price, its decision on service quality might consequently be affected. As
stated earlier, the extent of the price distortion increases with the decrease
of α. An extreme case is α = 0 and V = c = 0. The high-type firm’s profit
function is pi = 0 and the service quality is s∗H = 0. Thirdly, under the condi-
tions in Proposition 3, since the high-type firm’s decision on tipping or non-
tipping policy has changed, its service quality decision will also be influenced.
The high-type firm’s service quality decision under incomplete information
is obtained by maximizing pi{sH , 1, pHt∗, t} = V − c + (1 − β2 )sH − s2H and
si∗H =
1
2
− β
4
. Comparing the high-type firm’s service quality decision under
incomplete information with the service quality under complete information,
I find the following
Proposition 5. When the high-type firm endogenously decides its service
quality, its service quality under incomplete information si∗H is not higher
than the one under complete information s∗H , that is, s
i∗
H ≤ s∗H .
Proposition 5 shows that when there are uninformed consumers in the
market, the high-type firm may lower its service quality in comparison to its
decision when the market consists of only informed consumers. For example,
when the high-type firm needs to distort its retail price and keep the tipping
policy to signal its service quality under incomplete information, it does not
have any incentive to offer the service quality as high as under complete in-
formation. This is because the distortion of retail price reduces the firm’s
capability to compensate for the cost incurred by offering a service quality
as high as the one under complete information. Another case of lowering
the service quality under incomplete information is when the high-type firm
strategically uses the tipping policy to signal its service quality. Due to the
high consumers’ generosity, β > 3
2
, consumers’ tipping behavior is signifi-
cantly affected by the high type firm’s decision on service quality as shown
by the tip amount a consumer θ pays, i.e., θβsH . Expecting such tipping be-
havior, the high-type firm has to lower it retail price more if it sets a higher
service quality. Hence, together with the consideration of fixed cost f = s2,
the high-type firm has a lack of incentives to provide a service quality as high
as the one under complete information and the optimal decision is to have a
non-tipping policy.
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4.3.2 Both firm and server contribute to service
quality and share tips
In the main model of this chapter, I assume that the firm alone provides the
service and receives consumers’ tips. In this section, I consider the case where
both the firm and server contribute to the service and share consumers’ tips
proportionally to their contribution. As presented by assumptions in the
main model, the firm’s service quality sf is exogenously determined and can
be either sfh or sfl. Besides the firm’s contribution to service quality, the
server’s service quality is se, which can be either high seh or low sel and
seh > sel. I assume the following sequence. First, given the exogenously
determined firm’s service quality sf , the firm decides its retail price p and
tipping or non-tipping policy. Secondly, the server exerts efforts to contribute
to service quality, contingent on the firm’s specific policy. I assume that the
server can contribute two different levels of service quality depending on the
firm’s decision on tipping or non-tipping policy. When the firm chooses to
have a tipping policy, the server contributes seh. When the firm chooses to
have a non-tipping policy, the server contributes sel. I normalize sel = 0.
Thirdly, consumers make purchasing decision and pay accordingly.
I. Complete information
To simplify the analysis, I normalize sfl = 0. Hence the low-type firm’s
decision under complete information is to charge a retail price equal to V and
adopt a non-tipping policy. The high-type firm’s decision on tipping/non-
tipping policy depends on the comparison of its profits under each policy.
I save the derivations in the Technical Appendix and report the high-type
firm’s decision here. I obtain results similar to those shown in Lemma 1.
Under complete information, when both the firm and server contribute to
the service quality and share tips, the high-type firm should choose a tipping
policy when consumers’ generosity is low, i.e., 0 < β <
4seh+3sfh
4seh+2sfh
+ V−c
2seh+sfh
−
(V−c)2
2s2fh+4sehsfh
if sfh ≥ V − c and 0 < β < 2seh+2sfh2seh+sfh if sfh < V − c. It should
choose a non-tipping policy when consumers’ generosity is high, i.e., β >
4seh+3sfh
4seh+2sfh
+ V−c
2seh+sfh
− (V−c)2
2s2fh+4sehsfh
if sfh ≥ V −c and β > 2seh+2sfh2seh+sfh if sfh < V −c.
It is noteworthy to mention that when both the firm and server contribute
to the service quality and share tips, the high-type firm’s optimal profit under
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complete information (piht∗) can be either higher or lower than the one under
complete information (piHt∗) when the firm alone contributes to the service
quality and receives the tips. Specifically, when β < 1, piht∗ ≥ piHt and when
β > 1, piht∗ < piHt∗.
II. Incomplete information
When there is incomplete information, I mean that some consumers in the
market, i.e., the uninformed consumers, cannot ascertain a firm’s service
quality. I assume that the server knows the firm type before he/she exerts
efforts to contribute to service quality. Basically, the derivation of the high-
type firm’s signaling strategy follows the same procedure as in the main
model. In this section, I mainly examine whether the findings in the main
model still hold when both the firm and server contribute to the service
quality and share tips if the firm chooses to have a tipping policy. I derive
the conditions under which the main findings hold in the Technical Appendix.
Comparing these conditions to those when the firm alone contributes to the
service quality and receives the tips, I have the following finding
Proposition 6. When both the firm and server contribute to the service
quality and share tips, comparing to the signaling strategies when the firm
alone contributes to the service quality and receives tips, the high-type firm
(i) is less able to signal its service quality with its optimal decision under
complete information (tipping, pht∗) as in Proposition 1; (ii) is more likely
to signal its service quality with distorted retail price with the tipping policy
as in Proposition 2; and (iii) is less likely to strategically signal its service
quality with tipping policy when its optimal decision is the non-tipping policy
under complete information as in Proposition 3.
Proposition 6 shows the effect of the server’s contribution to the service
quality and sharing of tips on the high-type firm’s signaling strategy. The
reasons behind the finding (i) are as follows. When β < 1 and (1− β)(seh +
sfh) ≥ V −c, the contribution of the server’s service seh increases the optimal
retail price the high-type firm charges, which makes it more attractive for
the low-type firm to imitate. This attractiveness of high retail price leads
to the situation that the low-type firm can afford to lose more informed
consumers to profitably mimic the high-type firm’s strategy. In other words,
75
the threshold value of α has to be higher than α as in the main model. When
β < 1 and (1 − β)(seh + sfh) < V − c, since seh > 0, the parameter area is
more restrictive than the one (1− β)sH as in the main model. For the cases
when 1 < β <
4seh+3sfh
4seh+2sfh
+ V−c
2seh+sfh
− (V−c)2
2s2fh+4sehsfh
and sfh and 1 < β <
2seh+2sfh
2seh+sfh
and sfh < V − c, because of seh > 0, the parameter area of β gets tighter.
The reason the finding (ii) is complementary to the reason for the case when
β < 1 and (1 − β)(seh + sfh) ≥ V − c as explained for the finding (i). For
the finding (iii), it is because the involvement of the server’s contribution
to the service quality decreases the high-type firm’s profit under complete
information if it chooses to have a tipping policy, which makes it easier for
the low-type firm to mimic. Therefore, it is more difficult for the high-type
firm to strategically use the tipping policy to signal its service quality.
4.4 Conclusion
Tipping is a widely observed phenomenon guided by social norms. Across
different service industries, there may exist various levels of consumers’ gen-
erosity. Managers and executives have been actively managing the tipping
behavior in the market. This chapter offers explanations on how firms can
signal their service quality with this special policy by transferring part of
the decision of the final price to consumers. In particular, I investigate how
consumers’ generosity and the ratio of informed consumers to uninformed
consumers affect firms’ signaling strategy.
There are several interesting results which contribute to the existing signal-
ing literature with important managerial implications for marketing practice.
First, I show that under certain conditions the high-type firm can signal its
service quality to the uninformed consumers with a tipping policy on top
of the retail price which is its optimal strategy under complete information.
Different from the literature where pricing alone can signal the product qual-
ity (e.g. Bagwell and Riordan 1991), the research in this chapter shows that
under certain conditions it is not necessarily true that pricing alone can signal
the service quality when the tipping policy is banned. With the assistance
of tipping policy, the high-type firm can distinguish itself from the low-type
firm. An important managerial implication is that a marketing manager of
a high-type firm may want to transfer part of its price decision to consumers
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to “show” their true service quality when the industry level tipping practice
shows low consumers’ generosity.
Secondly, I show that a firm with high service quality may want to keep
the tipping policy and increase or decrease its retail price, despite its optimal
decision under complete information, to prevent the low-type from imitat-
ing. When consumers overall are not so generous and the ratio of informed
consumers to uninformed consumers is too low, it is rather beneficial for
the low-type to mimic the high-type. The high-type chooses to increase or
decrease its retail price but still takes advantage of the tipping policy.
Thirdly, even when tipping policy is not preferable under complete infor-
mation, a high-type firm may strategically choose to adopt it to send signals
about its high service quality to uninformed consumers. When a manager of
a high service provider makes decision on tipping/non-tipping policy, he/she
should also consider how to distinguish itself from the low service providers
and send signals to those consumers who could not directly tell its type. The
best strategy might be different from the one when all consumers know its
service type.
I acknowledge some limitations of the research in this chapter. Here, I
only consider the signaling issue with tipping policy in a monopoly context.
In the future, it would be interesting to investigate this issue in a duopoly
context. In addition, I assume that product quality and service quality are in-
dependent, and consumers pay tips based on the service quality only. Future
research can examine the scenarios where consumers’ tip amount is affected
by both service quality and product quality. Furthermore, I assume that
the two types of firms are different only in the dimension of service quality,
future research can study the case when two types are different on both the
service quality dimension and the product quality dimension.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I study firms’ decision-making on marketing mix vari-
ables with the considerations of (1) consumers’ uncertainty on product/service;
(2) consumers’ one or two-dimensional heterogeneity; and (3) their interac-
tions with other firms in the market.
Specifically, Chapter 2 studies firms’ advertising content decision in dis-
tribution channels and concludes that (1) a retailer may be more likely to
advertise or include more information in its advertisement in a decentralized
channel than in a centralized channel; (2) in a decentralized channel where
the retailer makes the advertising decision before its upstream manufacturer
makes the wholesale price decision, there may be less price-only advertising
and more price-product advertising than in a centralized channel; (3) when a
retailer makes the advertising decision prior to the wholesale price decision,
the commitment to the advertising content may even hurt itself as well as
the manufacturer; and (4) channel decentralization may increase consumer
welfare.
Chapter 3 studies a manufacturer’s product quality decision in distribution
channels and concludes that (1) when consumers are heterogeneous either
vertically on willingness-to-pay for product quality or horizontally on trans-
action costs, channel decentralization leads to same or lower product quality,
however, when consumers are heterogeneous on two dimensions, channel de-
centralization may lead to higher product quality; (2) when consumers are
heterogeneous on both dimensions, the decrease of consumer transaction cost
does not necessarily increase a firms profit; and (3) when consumers are het-
erogeneous on two dimensions, the decrease of consumer transaction cost
does not necessarily benefit consumers.
Chapter 4 studies a firm with high service quality relies on tipping policy
to distinguish itself from those with low service quality and concludes that:
(1) under certain conditions, the high-type firm can signal its service quality
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to the uninformed consumers with a tipping policy on top of the retail price
under complete information; (2) a firm with high service quality may want
to keep the tipping policy and increase or decrease its retail price under
complete information, to prevent the low-type from imitating; and (3) even
when tipping policy is not preferable under complete information, a high-
type firm may strategically choose to adopt it to send signals about its high
service quality to uninformed consumers.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
Proof of Proposition 1: Based on the retailer’s decision in the first stage,
there exist four sub-games: no-advertising, price-only advertising, product-
only advertising, and price-product advertising. Since product-only adver-
tising leads to consumers’ hold-up problem, there is zero demand for the
product and zero profit for the firms.
I. No advertising
Given a retail price r, the probability that a consumer will buy the product
is Prob(v ≥ r) = 1− r. Hence, the expected number of consumers that will
purchase the product is 1− r. Given the wholesale price of wndc, the retailer
maximizes its expected profit E(pindcR) = (r
n
dc − wndc)(1 − rndc) and charges
rndc =
1+wndc
2
, where the subscript dc refers to a decentralized channel with
the retailer’s earlier decision on its advertising content. Anticipating the
retailer’s decision of rndc =
1+wdc
2
, the upstream manufacturer maximizes its
expected profit E(pindcM) = w
n
dc(1−rndc). Hence the price decisions are wn∗dc = 12
and rn∗dc =
3
4
and the expected profits are E(pin∗dcM) =
1
8
and E(pin∗dcR) =
1
16
.
Similar as in the centralized channel, the condition under which all con-
sumers will search is
c ≤ E(max{v − rn∗dc , 0}) =
1
32
(A.1)
When the retailer does no-advertising, if c ≤ 1
32
, consumers will rationally
form expectations of the retail price and search for the product and price
information. If c > 1
32
, however, consumers will not search because the
expected benefit of doing it does not offset the cost of doing it.
II. Price-only advertising
When the retailer makes the decision of doing price-only advertising prior
to the manufacturer’s wholesale price decision, the retail price is set in such
a way that a consumer’s expected benefit of searching equals her search cost,
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which leads to rp∗dc = 1−
√
2c. However, with the anticipation of the retailer’s
decision of rp∗dc , the manufacturer will charge a wholesale price w
p∗
dc = r
p∗
dc =
1 − √2c. Therefore, the retailer’s expected profit is E(pip∗dcR) = 0 and the
manufacturer’s expected profit is E(pip∗dcM) =
√
2c− 2c.
III. Price-product advertising
The manufacturer’s profit and the retailer’s profit are pippdcM = w
pp
dc(1−rppdc−
c) and pippdcR = (r
pp
dc −wppdc)(1− rppdc − c). Following backward induction, I first
maximize the retailer’s profit and get rppdc =
1−c+wppdc
2
. Then I maximize the
manufacturer’s profit and get wpp∗dc =
1−c
2
and rpp∗dc =
3(1−c)
4
. The channel
members’ optimal profits are pipp∗dcM =
(1−c)2
8
and pipp∗dcR =
(1−c)2
16
.
Now, I solve the retailer’s decision on advertising content. By compar-
ing its profits across four sub-games, the retailer’s advertising strategy in
a decentralized channel where it makes its advertising decision prior to the
wholesale price decision is: When c ≤ 1
32
, the retailer will not advertise; When
1
32
< c < 1, the retailer will advertise both product and price information.
Therefore, I compare the advertising strategies in Table 1.2 to that in
Table 1.1 and conclude the following: When 1
32
< c < 0.4075, a retailer
does price-product advertising in a decentralized channel where the retailer
makes the advertising decision prior to its upstream manufacturer’s wholesale
price decision, but it conducts no-advertising or price-only advertising in a
centralized channel.
Proof of Proposition 2: Based on backward induction, given any wholesale
price (wd), the retailer decides the advertising content and its retail price (rd).
It can choose to have no-advertising, price-only advertising, product-only
advertising, or price-product advertising.
When the retailer chooses not to advertise at all, its expected profit is
E(pidR) = (rd − wd)(1 − rd) with the optimal price rd = 1+wd2 if
∫ 1
1+wd
2
(r −
1+wd
2
) = (1−wd)
2
8
≥ c. The retailer’s expected profit is pidR = (1−wd)24 . When
the retailer chooses to have price-only advertising, its expected profit is
E(pidR) = (rd−wd)(1−rd) with the optimal price rd = 1−
√
2c such that the
consumers’ expected surplus equals to their search cost. The retailer’s profit
is pidR = (1−
√
2c− w)√2c. When the retailer chooses to have product-ony
advertising, due to the consumers’ hold-up problem, there is no demand for
the product and zero profit for the retailer. When the retailer chooses to have
price-product advertising, its expected profit is E(pidR) = (rd−wd)(1−rd−c)
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with the optimal price rd =
1+wd−c
2
. The retailer’s profit is pidR =
(1−c−wd)2
4
.
By comparing the retailer’s profits across above four options, its best re-
sponse of advertising content and retail price is
(No− advertising, rd = 1+wd2 ), if wd ≤ 1− 2
√
2c;
(price− only, rd = 1−
√
2c), if 1− 2√2c < wd ≤ 1− 2
√
2c+ 25/4c3/4 − c;
(price+ product, rd =
1+wd−c
2
), if wd > 1− 2
√
2c+ 25/4c3/4 − c.
(A.2)
With the anticipation of the retailer’s best response, the manufacturer
maximizes its expected profit
E(pidM) =

wd × 1−wd2 , if wd ≤ 1− 2
√
2c;
wd ×
√
2c, if 1− 2√2c < wd ≤ 1− 2
√
2c+ 25/4c3/4 − c;
wd × 1−wd−c2 , if wd > 1− 2
√
2c+ 25/4c3/4 − c.
(A.3)
I solve each of the three constrained optimization problems for the man-
ufacturer and compare its optimal profits under each optimization problem,
and obtain the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price
w∗d =

1
2
, if c ≤ 0.0139;
1− 2√2c+ 25/4c3/4 − c, if 0.0139 < c ≤ 0.3447;
1−c
2
, if c > 0.3447.
(A.4)
Hence, based on the retailer’s best response, its retail price and advertising
content decisions are
(no− advertising, r∗d = 34), if c ≤ 0.0139;
(price− only, r∗d = 1−
√
2c), if 0.0139 < c ≤ 0.3447;
(price− product, r∗d = 3(1−c)4 ), if c > 0.3447.
(A.5)
Therefore, I compare the retailer’s advertising strategy in the decentralized
channel to that in the centralized channel and conclude the following: When
0.0139 < c < 1
8
(0.3447 < c < 0.4075), the retailer does price-only adver-
tising (price-product advertising) in a decentralized channel where it makes
advertising decision after its upstream manufacturer’s wholesale price deci-
sion, but it conducts no-advertising (price-only advertising) in a centralized
channel.
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Proof of Proposition 3:When an upstream manufacturer chooses not to
advertise its product information, given any wholesale price, by compar-
ing its profits across the following two options: (1) no-price advertising
and rnnds =
1+wnds
2
, which gives pinndsR =
(1−wnds)2
4
; and (2) price-advertising
and rnpds = 1 −
√
2c, which gives pinpdsR = (1 −
√
2c − wnds)
√
2c, the retailer’s
best response is (no − advertising, pnnds = 1+w
n
ds
2
) when wnds < 1 − 2
√
2c and
(price− advertising, rnpds = 1−
√
2c) when 1− 2√2c < wnds < 1−
√
2c. The
manufacturer then maximizes its profit under the option of no product ad-
vertising with the anticipation of the retailer’s best response and its optimal
decision is: wnds =
1
2
when c < 0.011 with pindsM =
1
8
, and wnds = 1−
√
2c when
0.011 < c < 0.5 with pindsM =
√
2c− 2c.
When an upstream manufacturer chooses to advertise its product informa-
tion, given any wholesale price, the retailer can only choose to advertise the
retail price because of the hold-up problem otherwise. The retailer maximizes
its profit pippdsR = (r
pp
ds −wppds)(1− rppds − c) and obtains rppds = 1+w
pp
ds−c
2
as it best
response when given any wholesale price. Then the manufacturer maximizes
its profit with the anticipation of the retailer’s best response and obtains the
optimal wholesale price wppds =
1−c
2
with the optimal profit pippdsM =
(1−c)2
8
.
Hence, the manufacturer compares its profits across two different options of
with and without product advertising and gets the final advertising decisions
for the distribution channel as follows: when c < 0.011, there is no advertising
on either product or price; When 0.011 < c < 0.463, there is price-only
advertising; when 0.463 < c < 1, there is price and product advertising.
Therefore, I compare the optimal advertising strategy in the decentral-
ized channel to that in the centralized channel, and conclude the following:
When 0.011 < c < 1
8
, the retailer does price-only advertising in a decentral-
ized channel where an upstream manufacturer decides on product advertising
and a downstream retailer decides on price advertising, but it conducts no
advertising in a centralized channel.
Proof of Proposition 4: In a decentralized channel where the retailer
makes the advertising decision prior to the manufacturer’s wholesale price
decision, the channel members’ profits are:
pi∗dcM =
{
1
8
, if c ≤ 1
32
;
(1−c)2
8
, if 1
32
< c < 1.
(A.6)
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pi∗dcR =
{
1
16
, if c ≤ 1
32
;
(1−c)2
16
, if 1
32
< c < 1.
(A.7)
In a decentralized channel where the retailer makes the advertising deci-
sion after the manufacturer’s wholesale price decision, the channel members’
profits are:
pi∗dM =

1
8
, if c ≤ 0.0139;
(1− 2√2c+ 25/4c3/4 − c)√2c, if 0.0139 < c ≤ 0.3447;
(1−c)2
8
, if c > 0.3447.
(A.8)
pi∗dR =

1
16
, if c ≤ 0.0139;
(
√
2c− 25/4c3/4 + c)√2c, if 0.0139 < c ≤ 0.3447;
(1−c)2
16
, if c > 0.3447.
(A.9)
The retailer’s earlier decision on its advertising strategy hurts the man-
ufacturer when 0.0139 < c < 0.3447 since pi∗dcM =
1
8
< pi∗dM = (1 −
2
√
2c + 25/4c3/4 − c)√2c when 0.0139 < c < 1
32
and pi∗dcM =
(1−c)2
8
< pi∗dM =
(1− 2√2c+ 25/4c3/4 − c)√2c when 1
32
< c < 0.3447.
The retailer’s earlier decision on its advertising strategy benefits the re-
tailer when 0.0139 < c < 0.0886 since pi∗dcR =
1
16
> pi∗dR = (
√
2c − 25/4c3/4 +
c)
√
2c when 0.0139 < c < 1
32
and pi∗dcR =
(1−c)2
16
> pi∗dR = (
√
2c − 25/4c3/4 +
c)
√
2c when 1
32
< c < 0.0886. The earlier decision hurts the retailer when
0.0886 < c < 0.3447 since pi∗dcR =
(1−c)2
16
< pi∗dR = (
√
2c−25/4c3/4 +c)√2c.
Proof of Proposition 5: When 1
8
< c < 0.4075 (0.3447 < c < 0.4075), in
the decentralized channel where the retailer makes the advertising decision
prior to (after) the manufacturer’s wholesale price decision, price-product ad-
vertising will be practiced and only consumers with non-negative consumers
will visit the store to purchase the information. So, at an aggregate level, con-
sumers receive positive welfare. However, in the centralized channel, when
1
8
< c < 0.4075 (0.3447 < c < 0.4075), only price-advertising is practiced
which means that consumers expected benefit of visiting the store equals to
the potential cost. So at an aggregate level, consumer welfare equals to zero.
Hence, channel decentralization leads to higher consumer welfare and the
first half of Proposition 6 is proved.
84
Next, I prove the second half of Proposition 5. In a decentralized channel
where the retailer makes its advertising decision prior to the manufacturer’s
wholesale price decision, consumer and social welfare are given by
CS∗dc =
{
1
32
− c, if c ≤ 1
32
;
(1−c)2
32
, if 1
32
< c < 1.
(A.10)
SW ∗dc =
{
7
32
− c, if c ≤ 1
32
;
7(1−c)2
32
, if 1
32
< c < 1.
(A.11)
In a decentralized channel where the retailer makes the advertising decision
after the manufacturer’s wholesale price decision, consumer and social welfare
are given by
CS∗d =

1
32
− c, if c ≤ 0.0139;
0, if 0.0139 < c ≤ 0.3447;
(1−c)2
32
, if c > 0.3447.
(A.12)
Social welfare is
SW ∗d =

7
32
− c, if c ≤ 0.0139;√
2c− 2c, if 0.0139 < c ≤ 0.3447;
7(1−c)2
32
, if c > 0.3447.
(A.13)
Hence, CS∗dc =
1
32
− c > CS∗d = 0 when 0.0139 < c < 132 and CS∗dc =
(1−c)2
32
> CS∗d = 0 when
1
32
< c < 0.3447. SW ∗dc =
7
32
− c > SW ∗d =
√
2c− 2c
when 0.0139 < c < 1
32
and SW ∗dc =
7(1−c)2
32
> SW ∗d =
√
2c−2c when 1
32
< c <
0.0394. SW ∗dc =
7
32
− c < SW ∗d =
√
2c− 2c when 0.0394 < c < 0.3447.
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Proof of Proposition 1: When consumers are vertically heterogeneous, the
manufacturer’s product quality decisions in the centralized and decentralized
channels are shown in Equations (1) and (3) respectively. By comparing
q∗vc and q
∗
vd, when a ≤ 23 , q∗vc = q∗vd = 13 ; when a > 23 , q∗vc > q∗vd since
q∗vc =
a
2
> q∗vd =
1
3
if 2
3
< a < 5
6
and q∗vc =
a
2
> q∗vd =
2a−1
2
if 5
6
< a < 1.
When consumers are horizontally heterogeneous, the manufacturer’s product
quality decisions in the centralized and decentralized channels are shown in
Equations (6) and (9). Obviously, q∗hc = q
∗
hd =
1
2
.
(Retailer’s profit) When consumers are vertically heterogeneous and con-
sumer heterogeneity is low, a > 5
6
, in the decentralized channel dpi
∗
vr
da
=
d(2a−1)(1−a)/2
da
= 3
2
− 2a < 0. When consumers are horizontally heteroge-
neous and consumer heterogeneity is low, t < 1
16
, in the decentralized channel
dpi∗hr
dt
= 1 > 0.
(Consumer welfare) When consumers are vertically heterogeneous and con-
sumer heterogeneity is low a > 2
3
(a > 5
6
) in the centralized channel (decen-
tralized channel), dCS
∗
vc
da
= 1
4
− a
2
< 0 (
dCS∗vd
da
= 3
4
− a < 0). When consumers
are horizontally heterogeneous and consumer heterogeneity is low t < 1
8
(t < 1
16
) in the centralized channel (decentralized channel),
dCS∗hc
dt
= 1
2
> 0
(
dCS∗hd
dt
= 1
2
> 0).
Proof of Proposition 2: To compare the optimal product quality in dif-
ferent distribution channels, I first solve the profit-maximization problem in
each distribution channel. In a centralized channel, maximizing the manu-
facturer’s profit pi = (p − q2) × D, where D = 1
1−a(1 − pq − t2q ) if q − p ≥ t
and D = (q−p)
2
(1−a)2qt if q − p < t, with respect to p and q, I obtain the optimal
product quality q∗C in the centralized channel
q∗C =
{
1+
√
1+6t
6
, if t < 4
25
;
2
5
, if t ≥ 4
25
.
(B.1)
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In a decentralized channel, the manufacturer’s profit is pi(M) = (w−q2)×D
and the retailer’s profit is pi(R) = (p−w)×D, where D = 1
1−a(1− pq − t2q ) if
q − p ≥ t and D = (q−p)2
(1−a)2qt if q − p < t. I solve the game based on backward
induction and maximize the retailer’s profit pi(R) with respect to the retail
price p. The retailer’s best responses are
p =
{
2q+2w−t
4
, if q − w ≥ 3t
2
;
q+2w
3
, if q − w < 3t
2
.
(B.2)
Then given the retailer’s best responses, I maximize the manufacturer’s
profit pi(M) with respect to w and q, and obtain the optimal product quality
q∗D in the decentralized channel
q∗D =

1+
√
1+6t
6
, if t ≤ 3
32
;√
3t
2
, if 3
32
< t < 8
75
;
2
5
, if t ≥ 8
75
;
(B.3)
When t ∈ ( 3
32
, 8
75
), I have q∗D− q∗C =
√
3t
2
− 1+
√
1+6t
6
> 0. When t ∈ [ 8
75
, 4
25
),
q∗D − q∗C = 25 − 1+
√
1+6t
6
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 3: In the decentralized channel , when 3
32
< t < 8
75
,
marginal consumers are θD(t, x) =
p
q
+ tx
q
. Since the marginal consumer
line crosses the consumer (θ, x) = (1, 1), the total demand of the product is
D = (q−p)
2
2qt(1−a) =
1
1−a(1− pq − t2q ) =
√
6t
6(1−a) , which increases with the increase of
t. The retailer’s profit margin p − w = t/2 also increases with the increase
of t. However, for the manufacturer, its profit margin w − q2 =
√
3t
2
− 3t
decreases with the increase of t and this effect outperforms the positive effect
of demand, because D∆(w−q
2)
∆t
+ (w − q2)∆D
∆t
=
√
6t
6(1−a)(
√
3
8t
− 3) + (
√
3t
2
−
3t)
√
6t
12t(1−a) =
1
4(1−a)(2 − 3
√
6t) < 0. The total channel profit increases with
the increase of t when t ∈ [ 3
32
, 8
75
] because when t ∈ [ 3
32
, 8
75
], ∆pi(M)
∆t
= 1
2(1−a) −
3
√
6t
4(1−a) < 0 and
∆pi(R)
∆t
=
√
6t
8(1−a) > 0, and
∆[pi(M)+pi(R)]
∆t
= 1
2(1−a)− 3
√
6t
4(1−a) +
√
6t
8(1−a) ≥
0.
When t ≤ 3
32
, since ∆pi(M)
∆t
= −3t+18t
2−(1+√1+6t)
6
√
1+6t(1+
√
1+6t)2(1−a) < 0 and
∆pi(R)
∆t
=
−3t+18t2−(1+√1+6t)
12
√
1+6t(1+
√
1+6t)2(1−a) < 0, both the manufacturer’s and retailer’s profits
increase with the decrease of t. Similarly, when t ≥ 8
75
, since ∆pi(M)
∆t
=
− 32
28125t2(1−a) < 0 and
∆pi(R)
∆t
= − 64
84375t2(1−a) < 0, both the manufacturer’s and
retailer’s profits increase with the decrease of t.
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In the centralized channel, when t ≤ 4
25
, ∆piC
∆t
= −3t+18t
2−(1+√1+6t)
3
√
1+6t(1+
√
1+6t)2(1−a) < 0,
and when t > 4
25
, ∆piC
∆t
= − 8
3125t2(1−a) < 0; thus, the profit increases with the
decrease of t.
Proof of Proposition 4:
In a decentralized channel, based on the optimal price and quality, the indi-
vidual consumer surplus SD(t, x) for consumers located at x with willingness-
to-pay θ can be described as:
SD(t, x) =

1+
√
1+6t
6
θ − 5−12t+5
√
1+6t
36
− tx, if 0 < t ≤ 3
32
;√
3t
2
θ − (
√
3t
2
− t)− tx, if 3
32
< t < 8
75
;
2
5
θ − 22
75
− tx, if t ≥ 8
75
.
(B.4)
The marginal consumers who are indifferent between buying and not buy-
ing are located at:
θD(x) =

5
6
− 6tx−2t
1+
√
1+6t
, if 0 < t ≤ 3
32
;
1 + (x− 1)
√
3t
2
, if 3
32
< t < 8
75
;
11
15
+ 5tx
2
, if t ≥ 8
75
.
(B.5)
By summing up the individual consumer surpluses, I obtain the following
consumer welfare:
CS∗D =

1−36t+(1+24t)√1+6t
432(1−a) , if t ≤ 332 ;
t
√
6t
18(1−a) , if
3
32
< t < 8
75
;
128
253125t(1−a) , if t ≥ 875 .
(B.6)
Since when 3
32
< t < 8
75
,
∆CS∗D
∆t
=
√
6t
12(1−a) > 0, consumer welfare increases
with the increase of t. But when 8
75
≤ t < 4
25
,
∆CS∗D
∆t
= − 128
253125t2(1−a) < 0,
consumer welfare decreases with the increase of t.
Social welfare consists of two parts, total consumer surplus and the channel
profit. In the decentralized channel, given the product quality and price, I
have:
SW ∗D =

1−36t+(1+24t)√1+6t
432(1−a) +
(1−6t+√1+6t)2
72(1+
√
1+6t)(1−a) , if 0 < t ≤ 332 ;
t
18(1−a)
√
6t+ t
2(1−a) − 5t12
√
6t(1− a), if 3
32
< t < 8
75
;
128
253125t(1−a) +
32
28125t(1−a) +
64
84375t(1−a) , if t ≥ 875 ;
(B.7)
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∂SW ∗D
∂t
=

< 0, if 0 < t ≤ 3
32
;
1
2(1−a) − 13
√
6t
24(1−a) > 0, if
3
32
< t < 8
75
;
< 0, if t ≥ 8
75
.
(B.8)
Thus, one can see that when t ∈ ( 3
32
, 8
75
), social welfare increases with
the increase of t. When t ≤ 3
32
or t ≥ 8
75
, social welfare decreases with the
increase of t.
In a centralized channel, based on the optimal product quality and price,
the surplus of individual consumer (θ, x) is
SC(t, x) =
{
1+
√
1+6t
6
θ − 2−3t+2
√
1+6t
18
− tx, if 0 < t ≤ 4
25
;
2
5
θ − 6
25
− tx, if t > 4
25
.
(B.9)
Thus, the marginal consumers (θC(t, x) who are indifferent between buying
and not buying are located at
θC(t, x) =
{
2−3t+2√1+6t
3(1+
√
1+6t)
+ 6tx
1+
√
1+6t
, if 0 < t ≤ 4
25
;
3
5
+ 5tx
2
, if t > 4
25
.
(B.10)
By summing up the individual consumer surpluses, I calculate consumer
welfare in the centralized channel as
CS∗C =
{
2−45t+(2+21t)√1+6t
216(1−a) , if 0 < t ≤ 425 ;
16
9375t(1−a) , if t >
4
25
.
(B.11)
Since when t ≤ 4
25
,
∆CS∗D
∆t
= 3+21t−5
√
1+6t
24
√
1+6t(1−a) < 0, and when t >
4
25
,
∆CS∗D
∆t
=
− 16
9375t2(1−a) < 0, consumer welfare always decreases with the increase of t.
Social welfare always decreases with the increase of t because
SW ∗C =
{
2−45t+(2+21t)√1+6t
216(1−a) +
(1−6t+√1+6t)2
54(1+
√
1+6t)(1−a) , if 0 < t ≤ 425 ;
16
9375t(1−a) +
8
3125t(1−a) , if t >
4
25
;
(B.12)
∂SW ∗C
∂t
=
{
< 0, if 0 < t ≤ 4
25
;
< 0, if t > 4
25
.
(B.13)
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Proof of Proposition 1: To prove that whether the strategy pair {(tipping,
pHt∗),(Non-tipping, V )} is a separating equilibrium satisfying intuitive cri-
terion, I check whether the strategy pair together with the uninformed con-
sumers’ updated beliefs b ∗ (tipping, pHt∗) = 1 and b ∗ (Non− tipping, V ) =
0 maximizes the high-type firm’s profit subject to two constraints. Con-
straint 1 is pi{sL, 1, pHt∗, t} ≤ (maxpi{sL, 0, p, x} = V ) and constraint 2 is
pi{sH , 1, pHt∗, t} ≥ maxpi{sH , 0, p, x}.
Since the strategy (tipping, pHt∗) maximizes the high-type’s profit under
complete information, I check whether the strategy also satisfies the two
constraints.
(1) Condition (i)
When β < 1 and (1− β)(sH − sL) > V − c, to satisfy Constraint 1, I need
pi{sL, 1, pHt∗, t} = pHt∗(1 − α)(1 − pHt∗−V(sH−sL)(1−β)) ≤ (maxpi{sL, 0, p, x} = V ),
that is, α > 1 − (2−β)2(sH−sL)V
[V+(1−β)c+(1−β)2(sH−sL)](sH−sL+V−c) . To satisfy Constraint 2,
we need pi{sH , 1, pHt∗, t} ≥ maxpi{sH , 0, p, x}, which means pi{sH , 1, pHt∗, t} ≥
max{pi{sH , 0, V, t}, pi{sH , 0, V, n}} and (V−c+sH−sL)22(2−β)(sH−sL) ≥ max{(V−c)+
∫ 1
0
β(sH−
sL)θdθ, V − c}. This holds under β < 1 and sH − sL > V − c. Hence,
I have condition (i) β < 1, V − c < (1 − β)(sH − sL) and α > 1 −
(2−β)2(sH−sL)V
[V+(1−β)c+(1−β)2(sH−sL)](sH−sL+V−c) .
(2) Condition (ii) When β < 1 and (1 − β)(sH − sL) < V − c, to satisfy
Constraint 1, I need pi{sL, 1, pHt∗, t} = V ≤ (maxpi{sL, 0, p, x} = V ). It
holds under β < 1 and (1−β)(sH − sL) < V − c. To satisfy Constraint 2, we
need pi{sH , 1, pHt∗, t} ≥ maxpi{sH , 0, p, x}, which means pi{sH , 1, pHt∗, t} ≥
max{pi{sH , 0, V, t}, pi{sH , 0, V, n}} and V − c+ β2 (sH − sL) ≥ max{(V − c) +∫ 1
0
β(sH−sL)θdθ, V −c}. It holds under β < 1 and (1−β)(sH−sL) < V −c.
Hence, I have condition (ii) β < 1 and (1− β)(sH − sL) < V − c.
(3) Condition (iii) and condition (iv)
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When 1 < β < 3
2
+ V−c
sH−sL −
(V−c)2
2(sH−sL)2 and sH − sL > V − c or 1 < β < 2
and sH − sL < V − c, to satisfy Constraint 1, I need pi{sL, 1, pHt∗, t} =
pHt∗[α+ (1− α)] ≤ (maxpi{sL, 0, p, x} = V ) which means V − (β − 1)(sH −
sL) ≤ V . It holds under 1 < β < 32 + V−csH−sL −
(V−c)2
2(sH−sL)2 and sH − sL >
V − c or 1 < β < 2 and sH − sL < V − c. To satisfy Constraint 2, we
need pi{sH , 1, pHt∗, t} ≥ maxpi{sH , 0, p, x}, which means pi{sH , 1, pHt∗, t} ≥
max{pi{sH , 0, V, t}, pi{sH , 0, V, n}} and V − c+(1− β2 )(sH−sL) ≥ max{(V −
c)(1−α)+(1−α) ∫ 1
0
β(sH−sL)θdθ, V −c}. It holds under 1 < β < 32 + V−csH−sL−
(V−c)2
2(sH−sL)2 and sH − sL > V − c or 1 < β < 2 and sH − sL < V − c. Therefore,
I have condition (iii) 1 < β < 3
2
+ V−c
sH−sL −
(V−c)2
2(sH−sL)2 and sH − sL > V − c and
condition (iv) 1 < β < 2 and sH − sL < V − c.
Proof of Proposition 2: I take three steps to prove Proposition 2. In
Step 1, I find the high-type firm’s pricing decision and its consequent profit
under tipping policy to separate itself from low-type. In Step 2, I find the
high-type firm’s pricing decision and its consequent profit under non-tipping
policy to separate itself from low-type. In Step 3, I compare the high-type
firm’s profits in Step 1 and Step 2.
To have α = 1− (2−β)2(sH−sL)V
[V+(1−β)c+(1−β)2(sH−sL)](sH−sL+V−c) ∈ [0, 1], I need to have
(1−β)(sH−sL) > V +(1−β)c. So, in the following, I focus on the situations
where (1− β)(sH − s− L) > V + (1− β)c.
Step 1: If the high-type firm adopts a tipping policy, when α < α, since
pi{sL, 1, pHt∗, t} = pHt∗(1 − α)(1 − p−V(sH−sL)(1−β)) ≥ (maxpi{sL, 0, p, x} = V ),
it is profitable for the low-type firm to mimic the high-type’s strategy. So,
the high-type firm needs to distort its retail price to ensure that the low-
type firm will not imitate. That is, to satisfy constraint 1, pi{sL, 1, p, t} =
p(1 − α)(1 − p−V
(sH−sL)(1−β)) ≤ (maxpi{sL, 0, p, x} = V ), it must set the retail
price such that p ≤ p = V+(sH−sL)(1−β)−
q
[V+(sH−sL)(1−β)]2− 4V (sH−sL)(1−β)1−α
2
or p ≥
p =
V+(sH−sL)(1−β)+
q
[V+(sH−sL)(1−β)]2− 4V (sH−sL)(1−β)1−α
2
. When V +(1−β)c < (1−
β)(sH−sL) < V + (2−2β)cβ , the high-type firm distorts its retail price upwards
to p since (1−β)c+V+(1−β)
2(sH−sL)
2−β >
(sH−sL)(1−β)+V
2
. When (1− β)(sH − sL) >
V + (2−2β)c
β
, the high-type firm distorts its retail price downwards to p. In
both cases, when α is closer to α, p (or p) is closer to pHt∗. When α is closer
to zero, p (or p) is farer from pHt∗. The extent of distortion gets stronger
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with the decrease of α.
Step 2: If the high-type firm adopts a non-tipping policy, it can not dis-
tinguish itself from low-type with the strategy (non − tipping, pHn∗) when
α < 1 − 4V (sH−sL)
(sH−sL+V )2−c2 because pi{sL, 1, pHn∗, n} ≥ V . Then the high-type
can choose to distort its retail price under non-tipping policy to signal itself.
The optimal distorted price is p =
V+sH−sL+
q
(V+sH−sL)2− 4V (sH−sL)1−α
2
and its
consequent profit is pi{sH , 1, p, n} = (p− c)(1− p−VsH−sL ).
When α > 1− 4V (sH−sL)
(sH−sL+V )2−c2 , the high-type firm can distinguish itself from
low-type with the strategy (non− tipping, pHn∗), and its profit is
pi{sH , 1, pHn∗, n} = (V−c+sH−sL)24(sH−sL) .
To have 1− 4V (sH−sL)
(sH−sL+V )2−c2 < α < 1−
(2−β)2(sH−sL)V
[V+(1−β)c+(1−β)2(sH−sL)](sH−sL+V−c) , it
requires V
1−β − c1−β < sH − sL < (4−β)V4−3β − βc4−3β . Since (1−β)(sH − sL) > V +
(1−β)c means sH−sL > V1−β +c, it contradicts with sH−sL < (4−β)V4−3β − βc4−3β
because V
1−β >
(4−β)V
4−3β . So the case that the high-type firm can distinguish
itself with the strategy (non−tipping, pHn∗) when 1− 4V (sH−sL)
(sH−sL+V )2−c2 < α < α
and 0 < α < 1 does not exist.
Step 3: When 0 < β < 1, (1− β)(sH − sL) > V + (1− β)c, and α < α, I
compare the high-type firm’s profits under two situations: the distorted price
together with tipping policy pi{sH , 1, p, t} (or pi{sH , 1, p, t}) and distorted
price together with non-tipping policy pi{sH , 1, p, n} when α = 0. When
(1 − β)(sH − sL) > V2 + (1 − β)c, the one under tipping policy, that is,
pi{sH , 1, p, t} (or pi{sH , 1, p, t}), is higher than the one under non-tipping
policy, that is, pi{sH , 1, p, n}. Since I have (1−β)(sH − sL) > V + (1−β)c >
V
2
+ (1− β)c and the price distortion is the most when α = 0, it means that
the high-type firm is better off with distorted price and tipping policy when
α < α.
Proof of Proposition 3: Similar as the proof of Proposition 2, I also take
three steps to prove Proposition 3. In Step 1, I show the high-type firm’s
pricing decision and its consequent profit under non-tipping policy when
it can successfully separate itself. In Step 2, I show the high-type firm’s
pricing decision and its consequent profit under tipping policy when it can
successfully separate itself. In Step 3, I compare the high-type firm’s profits
in Step 1 and Step 2.
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Step 1: When 3
2
+ V−c
sH−sL −
(V−c)2
2(sH−sL)2 < β < 2 and sH−sL > V −c, it cannot
separate itself from low-type by its optimal decision (non−tipping, pHn∗) un-
der complete information when the low-type can mimic it. That is, when α ≤
1− 4V (sH−sL)
(sH−sL+V )2−c2 , pi{sL, 1, pHn∗, non− tipping} = pHn∗(1−α)(1−
pHn∗−V
sH−sL ) =
V+c+sH−sL
2
(1 − α)(1 −
V+c+sH−sL
2
−V
sH−sL ) ≥ V . The high-type distorts its price
such that the low-type does not have incentive to imitate it. The retail price
should be set to satisfy pi(sL, 1, p, non− tipping) = p(1−α)(1− p−VsH−sL ) ≤ V .
Let p and p be the solutions for pi{sL, 1, p, non − tipping} = V . Then
p =
V+sH−sL−
q
(V+sH−sL)2− 4V (sH−sL)1−α
2
and p =
V+sH−sL+
q
(V+sH−sL)2− 4V (sH−sL)1−α
2
.
The high-type firm is better off with p than with p since V+c+sH−sL
2
≥
V+sH−sL
2
.
Step 2: When 3
2
+ V−c
sH−sL −
(V−c)2
2(sH−sL)2 < β < 2 and sH−sL > V −c, the high-
type firm can separate itself from low-type with the strategy (tipping, pHt∗),
and its profit is pi{sH , 1, pHt∗, t} = V − c+ (1− β2 )(sH − sL).
Step 3: When 3
2
+ V−c
sH−sL −
(V−c)2
2(sH−sL)2 < β < 2− 2αV(1−α)(sH−sL) −
c[sH−sL−V+
q
(sH−sL+V )2− 4V (sH−sL)1−α ]
(sH−sL)2 , sH − sL > V − c, α ≤ 1 −
4V (sH−sL)
(sH−sL+V )2−c2
and c <
√
(sH − sL + V )2 − 4V (sH−sL)1−α , pi{sH , 1, p, n} < pi{sH , 1, pHt∗, t} =
V − c+ (1− β
2
)(sH − sL).
Proof of Proposition 4: When β > 2 and sH − sL < V − c, the high-type
firm’s optimal decision under complete information is (non − tipping, V ),
which is the same decision as the low-type firm’s. When there is uninformed
consumers in the market, the high-type firm can not get higher profit by
choosing any strategy other than (non−tipping, V ) to separate itself from the
low-type firm. So, both types of firms choose the same strategy and the unin-
formed consumers will maintain their prior beliefs as b(non−tipping, V ) = γ.
This following consists of two major parts. In the first part, I derive the high-
type firm’s optimal decision on tipping/non-tipping policy under complete
information when both firm and server contribute to the service quality and
share tips. In the second part, I derive the conditions under which the main
findings hold when both firm and server contribute to the service quality and
share tips.
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I. The high-type firm’s decision when both firm and server con-
tribute to the service quality and share tips
When the high-type firm chooses to have a non-tipping policy, its profit
function is similar the firm’s profit as presented in the main model. Replacing
sH − sL with sfh, I have
pihn = (p− c)(1− p− V
sfh
) (C.1)
The optimal retail price and profits are
phn∗ =
{
V+c+sfh
2
, if sfh ≥ V − c;
V, if sfh < V − c;
pihn∗ =
{
(V−c+sfh)2
4sfh
, if sfh ≥ V − c;
V − c, if sfh < V − c.
(C.2)
When the high-type firm chooses to have a tipping policy, its profit function
is
pi
ht
=
8>><>>:
(p− c)(1− p−V(sfh+seh)(1−β) ) +
sfh
sfh+seh
R 1
p−V
(sfh+seh)(1−β)
β(sfh + seh)θdθ, if β < 1;
(p− c) V−p(sfh+seh)(β−1) +
sfh
sfh+seh
R V−p(sfh+seh)(β−1)
0 β(sfh + seh)θdθ, if β > 1;
(C.3)
Its optimal price and profits are
p
ht∗
=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
(1−β)2(seh+sfh)2+c(1−β)(seh+sfh)+[(1−β)seh+sfh]V
2(1−β)seh+(2−β)sfh
, if β < 1, (1− β)(seh + sfh) ≥ V − c;
V, if β < 1, (1− β)(seh + sfh) < V − c;
V − (β − 1)(seh + sfh), if 1 ≤ β ≤
2seh+2sfh
2seh+sfh
;
(1−β)c(seh+sfh)+[(1−β)seh+sfh]V
2(2−β)sfh+2(1−β)seh
, if β >
2seh+2sfh
2seh+sfh
, (β − 2)(seh + sfh) ≥ V − c;
V − (β − 1)(seh + sfh), if β >
2seh+2sfh
2seh+sfh
, (β − 2)(seh + sfh) < V − c.
(C.4)
pi
ht∗
=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
[V−c+(1−β)seh+sfh]2
4(1−β)seh+2(2−β)sfh
, if β < 1, (1− β)(seh + sfh) ≥ V − c;
V − c + β2 sfh, if β < 1, (1− β)(seh + sfh) < V − c;
V − c− (β − 1)seh + (1− β2 )sfh, if 1 ≤ β ≤
2seh+2sfh
2seh+sfh
;
(V−c)2
4(β−1)seh+2(β−2)sfh
, if β >
2seh+2sfh
2seh+sfh
, (β − 2)(seh + sfh) ≥ V − c;
V − c− (β − 1)seh + (1− β2 )sfh, if β >
2seh+2sfh
2seh+sfh
, (β − 2)(seh + sfh) < V − c.
(C.5)
Comparing the high-type firm’s profits under tipping/non-tipping policy,
we have its optimal decision as follows. Under complete information, when
the firm and server(s) both contribute to the service quality and share tips,
the high-type firm should choose a tipping policy when consumers’ generosity
is low, i.e., 0 < β <
4seh+3sfh
4seh+2sfh
+ V−c
2seh+sfh
− (V−c)2
2s2fh+4sehsfh
if sfh ≥ V − c and
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0 < β <
2seh+2sfh
2seh+sfh
if sfh < V −c. It should chooses a non-tipping policy when
consumers’ generosity is high, i.e., β >
4seh+3sfh
4seh+2sfh
+ V−c
2seh+sfh
− (V−c)2
2s2fh+4sehsfh
if
sfh ≥ V − c and β > 2seh+2sfh2seh+sfh if sfh < V − c.
II. The conditions under which the main findings hold
The conditions under which the results in Proposition 1 hold are:
(i) 0 < β < 1, (1−β)(seh+sfh) ≥ V−c and α > max{ (p
ht∗−V )[(1−β)(seh+sfh−pht∗)]
pht∗[V+(1−β)(seh+sfh)−pht∗] ,
0} where pht∗ = (1−β)2(seh+sfh)2+c(1−β)(seh+sfh)+[(1−β)seh+sfh]V
2(1−β)seh+(2−β)sfh ;
(ii) 0 < β < 1 and (1− β)(seh + sfh) < V − c;
(iii) 1 < β <
4seh+3sfh
4seh+2sfh
+ V−c
2seh+sfh
− (V−c)2
2s2fh+4sehsfh
and sfh ≥ V − c;
(iv) 1 < β <
2seh+2sfh
2seh+sfh
and sfh < V − c.
The conditions under which the results in Proposition 2 hold are: when 0 <
β < 1, (1−β)(seh+sfh) > V−c, and (1−β)
2(seh+sfh)
2+c(1−β)(seh+sfh)+[(1−β)seh+sfh]V
2(1−β)seh+(2−β)sfh ,
the high-type firm will distort its retail price and keep the tipping policy to
effectively signal its service quality.
The conditions under which the results in Proposition 3 hold are: when
4seh+3sfh
4seh+2sfh
+ V−c
2seh+sfh
− (V−c)2
2s2fh+4sehsfh
< β <
2[ep2+c(V−ep)−ep(V+sfh)+(V+seh+sfh)sfh]
sfh(2seh+sfh)
,
sfh ≥ V − c and α < (V−sfh+c)(V−sfh−c)(V+sfh)2−c2 where p˜ is the bigger solution to
pi{sL, 1, p, n} = p(1− α)(1− p−Vsfh ) = V , the high-type firm will strategically
choose to have a tipping policy to signal its service quality even it optimally
chooses to have a non-tipping policy under complete information.
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